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ARTICLE

Unintended Agency Problems: How
International Bureaucracies Are Built and
Empowered
ANU BRADFORD,* STAVROS GADINIS,** AND KATERINA LINOS***
The ground underneath the entire liberal international order is rapidly shifting.
Institutions as diverse as the European Union, International Monetary Fund, United
Nations, and World Trade Organization are under major threat. These institutions
reflect decades of political investments in a world order where institutionalized
cooperation was considered an essential cornerstone for peace and prosperity. Going
beyond the politics of the day, this Article argues that the seeds of today’s discontent
with the international order were in fact sown back when these institutions were first
created. We show how states initially design international institutions with features
that later haunt them in unexpected ways. In the worst cases, states become so
dissatisfied with the institutions they build that they threaten to abandon or dissolve
them, shaking the foundations of the international order. Our central argument is that
two cooperation problems intersect in unanticipated ways. The first problem —the
horizontal conflict—involves the distribution of benefits among states. When states
first create an international organization, they seek to capture a big share of the benefits
and protect their interests vis-à-vis other states. They do this by demanding voting rules
that allow them to block unfavorable decisions, requiring leadership positions for their
own nationals, and lobbying to include their priority issues on the organization’s
agenda. We argue that this initial effort to resolve distributional conflicts is shortsighted, ultimately leaving states dissatisfied with the international organizations they
build. The second problem—the vertical conflict among states collectively, on the one
hand, and international organization bureaucracies and tribunals, on the other—is
worsened by the compromises reached to resolve the horizontal conflict. For example,
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when states agree that key decisions must be reached by consensus, it becomes difficult
to roll back the actions of a wayward secretariat or tribunal down the line. Or, when
states place their own nationals in key positions, a multi-national body with an
international agenda emerges. Such an international organization can become detached
from the national concerns of its creators. Moreover, when states put their key issues
on the organization’s agenda, a broad mandate results. In turn, a broad mandate
empowers the organization’s staff to set its own priorities, making state control difficult.
Contrary to prior isolated studies on horizontal and vertical conflicts, we are the first
to identify how the two conflicts intersect in important and unexpected ways. To find
possible solutions, we draw on analogous intersections in corporate law literature, which
have been examined more thoroughly.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Populist voices and election outcomes in the United States and Europe
have made it clear that international cooperation is not in vogue.
International institutions are increasingly associated with all things evil, be it
the loss of jobs, the loss of a sense of personal and national security, or the
dissolution of local culture and identity as we know it. Nationalist currents
have supplanted the notion that common problems are beyond any
individual nation’s capacity to resolve alone, calling into question the very
existence of international institutions as the bedrock of the global order.
Examples abound. Deep discontent with the European Union (EU) is
threatening to tear it apart. Up north, the United Kingdom has begun the
unprecedented process of negotiating its exit from the EU after a bitter
referendum on its membership in the body.1 British Euro-sceptics have for
decades derided regulations and directives issued by Brussels, and have
abhorred treaty commitments toward “an ever-closer union.”2 Most
recently, critics of European integration have directed their ire toward
migrants from other EU-member states, claiming that their influx into the
U.K. has placed immense strain on the country’s welfare programs.3 Yet
even when facing mounting criticism directed at the free movement of
people, EU institutions remain steadfast in defending the right of all EU
citizens to live, work, and receive equal treatment throughout the Union.
Along the EU’s southern border, Greece in particular has been unable to
stem the tide of refugees fleeing upheaval in the Middle East. Once such
refugees enter an EU-member state, they enjoy uninhibited access to other
member states, due to the abolishment of border controls under the
Schengen agreement.4 Consequently, the migration problem in the South
quickly evolved into a problem for the entire EU. As anger among member
states mounted, European Council leadership made an unprecedented move
by threatening Greece with temporary suspension from the Schengen zone.5
These examples suggest that while European states initially created the EU
1 Tara Palmeri, The EU and David Cameron: We Need to Talk About Brexit, POLITICO (Feb. 2, 2016),
http://www.politico.eu/article/brexit-david-cameron-european-union-eu-migrant-reform/.
2 Id.
3 This is recognized as the most controversial part in Britain. See George Parker & Alex Barker,
Cameron’s EU Deal: What the UK Has—and Has Not—Secured, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 3, 2016),
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/ed0b3516-c9a6-11e5-a8efea66e967dd44.html#axzz3zXD1smLN; see also Alberto Nardelli et al., Fortress Mentality on EU Migration
Creates Xenophobia, Warns Italian PM, GUARDIAN (Jan. 19, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/uknews/2015/jan/19/fortress-mentality-european-migration-creates-xenophobia-italian-pm-matteorenzi.
4 Schengen Agreement, EUR. COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-wedo/policies/borders-and-visas/schengen/index_en.htm (last visited Dec. 3, 2017).
5 Jim Brunsden, Kerin Hope & Peter Spiegel, EU Threatens to Reimpose Greek Border Controls, FIN.
TIMES
(Jan.
27,
2016),
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/674647a6-c4f9-11e5-808f8231cd71622e.html#axzz3zXD1smLN.
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as their agent, their roles have reversed. Increasingly, the EU is acting as
principal, insisting that member states implement its mounting regulations
and rulings, whether in their national interest or not.
At the core of both the horizontal and vertical conflicts lies the EU’s
doctrines about free movement of people, which mandate that all EU
nationals enjoy the privileges traditionally offered exclusively to each
member state’s own citizens.6 The Schengen zone further facilitates free
movement by removing border controls.7 Although now considered
bedrocks of European integration, the free movement principle was not
forged in the intense state-to-state negotiations that typically produce EU
treaties. Rather, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) relied on scant and
cryptic treaty language to give practical significance to these doctrines.8 The
ECJ often acted at the behest of the European Commission, which brought
complaints against member states not pursuing integration in earnest.9 It
may seem surprising that member states vested EU institutions with powers
that are now deployed against them. However, this was a natural response
to the horizontal conflict at the time. The ECJ and Commission were
entrusted with interpretation and implementation powers because they were
established as neutral arbiters, who would not do one member state’s
bidding against others. This neutral status required the ECJ and
Commission to operate outside of any single state’s control. Yet, over the
years, EU institutions converted this independence into a powerful
instrument to pursue their own agenda, even when it ran contrary to the will
of governments that established them in the first place.
The EU is hardly the only international organization (IO) threatened by
schism. The International Monetary Fund (IMF), another pillar of the postWWII order, now shares the global scene with the New Development Bank,
founded by Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS).10 As
these countries’ importance in the world economy grew significantly in the
past fifteen years, they sought to increase their voice in global fora. These
countries thought past attempts to reform the IMF governance structure
had not gone far enough, and were dissatisfied by the Europeans’ decadesold power-sharing agreement with the U.S., which saw Europeans continue
6 Ottavio Marzocchi, Fact Sheets on the European Union: Free Movement of Persons, EUR.
PARLIAMENT (June 2017),
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/atyourservice/en/displayFtu.html?ftuId=FTU_2.1.3.html.
7 Gerald L. Neuman, Buffer Zones Against Refugees: Dublin, Schengen, and the German Asylum
Amendment, 33 VA. J. INT’L L. 503 (1993).
8 Karen Alter, Who Are the “Masters of the Treaty”?: European Governments and the European Court of
Justice, 52 INT’L ORG. 121 (1998); J.H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 2403 (1991).
9 RACHEL A. C ICHOWSKI, THE EUROPEAN COURT AND CIVIL SOCIETY: LITIGATION,
MOBILIZATION AND GOVERNANCE 137 tbl.4.5, 139 tbl.4.6 (2007).
10 Raj M. Desai & James R. Vreeland, What the New Bank of BRICS Is All About, WASH. POST (July
17, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2014/07/17/what-the-newbank-of-brics-is-all-about/.
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to select the IMF head.11 Thus, when the IMF participated in the Greek
bailout under terms generally perceived as more favorable than those
extended to non-Europeans, BRICS voiced their opposition in no uncertain
terms.12 Shortly thereafter, in a move steeped in symbolism, they announced
their own international development bank initiative.
Nevertheless, it is not only emerging economic powers that question the
merits of existing institutions. The United States—the architect of much of
the post-WWII institutional order—is also threatening to walk away from
the order it created and actively supported throughout the post-WWII era.
The new Trump administration is currently renegotiating the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). It has also threatened to
withdraw from, or renegotiate, many other international treaties that,
allegedly, do not serve its interests, possibly including the World Trade
Organization (WTO). Recent executive orders also aim to undermine
institutions such as the United Nations by withholding funding from its
operations.13 If the United States goes through with its threat to cut at least
40% of its contributions to international agencies, it will severely hamper
the ability of those agencies to function. For example, the U.S. currently
funds a quarter of UN peacekeeping operations, which, absent U.S. support,
may not be able to continue.
In the examples above, and in others discussed below, conflicts between
IOs and the states they represent grew so heated that withdrawal of support,
exit, or the creation of a competing institution were deemed appropriate
responses. Such radical outcomes are hard to explain based on existing
accounts of IOs, even those typically critical of these institutions. For
example, if one accepts that powerful member states dominate IOs, then it
is difficult to understand how IOs develop the strength to turn against these
states. On the other hand, if one sees IOs as international bureaucrats
spinning out of control, it is hard to understand why states created them in
the first place, and why they believe that creating new competing institutions
is a plausible alternative.
We argue that these crises are connected at their roots and arise out of
the intersection of two challenges that have thus far been studied separately.
11
Why
Have
Europeans
Dominated
the
IMF?,
NPR
(June
9,
2011),
http://www.npr.org/2011/06/09/137075631/should-a-european-head-the-imf.
12 Leonid Bershidsky, IMF Reform Is Too Little, Too Late, BLOOMBERG V IEW (Dec. 18, 2015),
http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2015-12-18/imf-reform-is-too-little-way-too-late.
13 Max Fisher, Trump Prepares Orders Aiming at Global Funding and Treaties, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 25,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/25/us/politics/united-nations-trumpadministration.html?_r=0; Geoff Dyer, Donald Trump Threatens to Pull US Out of WTO, FIN. TIMES
(Jul. 24, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/d97b97ba-51d8-11e6-9664-e0bdc13c3bef; James
Bacchus, Trump’s Challenge to the WTO, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 4, 2017),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/trumps-challenge-to-the-wto-1483551994; Ayesha Rascoe, Trump to
Begin Renegotiating NAFTA Pact Soon with Mexico, Canada, REUTERS, Jan. 22, 2017,
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-nafta-idUSKBN156128.
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The first challenge concerns conflicts among member states (horizontal
conflicts), while the second challenge focuses on conflicts between member
states as a group and the IOs (vertical conflicts). We argue that when IOs
are first established, the possibility of horizontal conflict among states looms
large in negotiators’ minds. States therefore design IOs with features that
protect them from the overreach and shirking of other states. However, as
these IOs mature—and separate secretariats, courts, and other governance
bodies gain power—a deep vertical conflict between the states collectively,
and the IOs, begins to emerge. We claim that design features initially
designed to protect states from each other ultimately limit states’ collective
ability to control wayward bureaucracies and courts. In other words, the
measures designed to resolve the horizontal conflict inadvertently lay a
foundation for a vertical conflict, leading states from one problem to
another. Throughout this Article, we will refer to this interaction between
the horizontal and vertical conflicts as the “joint problem.”
When today’s major IOs were designed shortly after World War II, each
government sought to capture its fair share of the gains from cooperation,
and worried that foreign governments might make decisions that only
benefited them. We call this distributional conflict among states a horizontal
conflict. For instance, in setting up the EU’s predecessor—the European
Coal and Steel Community—France, Germany, and every other state
wanted to guarantee receipt of its fair share of the common goods produced
by the organization. Of course, this horizontal conflict is not peculiar to the
EU; it characterizes every IO. It stems from the fact that modern states
understand themselves first and foremost as nation-states, and only
secondarily as members of a global community.
One way in which states preserved their power vis-à-vis other states in
their initial bargains was by insisting on super-majority or, even more
commonly, unanimity for every important decision. Another way in which
states sought to prevail vis-à-vis other states was by demanding spots within
IOs’ bureaucracies for their nationals. Still another technique states
employed was geographic; they located IOs far from their rivals’ capitals, in
small and neutral countries. Finally, states created IOs with relatively broad
mandates, in an effort to link diverse issues that were important to different
states.
As time passed, IOs grew in complexity. They acquired more powers as
states delegated major tasks to bodies that were increasingly independent
from state control, such as the European Commission and European
Courts, the UN Secretariat, and the WTO dispute settlement body. This
delegation of power, while mitigating the horizontal conflict, planted the
seeds for an emerging vertical conflict between states as principals and IOs
as their agents.
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We will show that measures devised to improve each state’s bargaining
position vis-à-vis foreign states often unintentionally weaken states’
collective control over the very institutions they designed. For example, the
rule that every state must consent to every major decision means that once
power is delegated, it is almost impossible to obtain the votes necessary to
rein in wayward bureaucracies and tribunals. Similarly, the rule that every
state can place its nationals in key IO positions means that IO secretariats
and courts are composed of people from many countries, who in turn
develop supra-national affinities, and are more eager to move key powers
away from national capitals and toward the IO. Relatedly, IOs are often set
up in relatively remote locations—such as Brussels, Luxembourg, Geneva,
and The Hague—far from the national capitals of most powerful states.
When this happens, civil servants and judges end up socializing primarily
with other internationally minded persons, and lose touch with the day-today concerns in national capitals. Finally, due to broad IO mandates, IO
staff members have greater room to prioritize issues they consider
important, sometimes at the expense of member states’ interests.
Accordingly, such a broad mandate makes it harder to monitor the IO’s
performance, compromising states’ abilities to detect and sanction its
wayward activities.
The central claim we will advance below is one of unintended
consequences where states, while mitigating one obstacle for cooperation,
simply replace it with another. In other words, when addressing the
horizontal conflict, states lay the seeds for a vertical conflict. The existing
literature on IOs has examined these conflicts in isolation, failing to address
the interdependence between the two. In developing our claim, we will build
on a prominent tradition in rationalist literature that explores the benefits
and costs of centralization and delegation to a neutral actor.14 We will also
draw on important constructivist work that explains how international
organizations, like all bureaucracies, create standardization and end up
applying path-dependent models to distinct problems.15 Both the vertical
and horizontal conflicts are well explored in various literatures; our
innovation is in studying how they intersect.16
14 See, e.g., Kenneth Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Why States Act Through Formal International
Organizations, 42 J. CONFLICT R ESOL. 3, 9–29 (1998).
15 See, e.g., Michael N. Barnett & Martha Finnemore, The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International
Organizations, 53 INT’L ORG. 699, 707–27 (1999).
16 The most closely related literature trends mention, but then bracket, the issue of multiple
principals. See, e.g., DELEGATION AND AGENCY IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS (Darren G.
Hawkins, David A. Lake, Daniel L. Nielson & Michael J. Tierney eds., 2006); Beth A. Simmons, Frank
Dobbin & Geoffrey Garrett, Introduction: The International Diffusion of Liberality, 60 INT’L ORG. 781
(2006); Zachary Elkins, Andrew T. Guzman & Beth A. Simmons, Competing for Capital: The Diffusion of
Bilateral Investment Treaties, 1960–2000, 60 INT’L ORG. 811 (2006); Duane Swank, Tax Policy in an Era of
Internationalization: Explaining the Spread of Neoliberalism, 60 INT’L ORG. 847 (2006); Chang Kil Lee &
David Strang, The International Diffusion of Public-Sector Downsizing: Network Emulation and Theory-Drive
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In elucidating the interrelated nature of vertical and horizontal conflicts,
we will turn to corporate law—a field where the joint problem has been
widely studied, but on which the literature on IOs has not drawn extensively.
Corporate law often delegates major decision-making power to boards, not
only to enhance the smoothness of day-to-day operations, but also to
protect small, passive shareholders from large, active ones. However,
delegating broad powers to a board can entrench the board and allow it to
make decisions independent of shareholder concerns. To ameliorate this
joint problem, corporate law specifies a series of governance rules, including
disclosure obligations, proposal-making rules, and voting rules. We will
draw some lessons from corporate law about how specifically to structure
and implement transparency and minority protection.
An enhanced understanding of the interdependence between horizontal
and vertical conflicts enables us to grapple with the specific contexts and
conditions in which the joint problem is likely the most salient. For example,
we expect the horizontal conflict to be most acute for young international
bodies, and the vertical conflict to become sharper as organizations grow
and, critically, delegate more powers to supra-national organs.17
Additionally, we expect small and large states to perceive the relative threat
of the horizontal and vertical conflict to their sovereignty in different ways.
While large and economically powerful countries are likely to see centralized
institutions as constraints on their power, small countries may benefit from
delegation to institutions that gradually come to advance the collective
preferences of the member states. We will therefore explore the scope for,
and the particular manifestations of, our argument before concluding.
We will conclude by conceding that the joint problem is here to stay;
reversing the features that initially created the joint problem is rarely a viable
option for states. We are unlikely to see a radical reform of voting rules, the
repatriation of internationally minded and networked staff, the relocation of
IO headquarters, or the delinking of issues to create single-issue IOs. We
will explore how some options to escape the joint problem—exiting from
the IO, creating smaller, more homogeneous regional organizations, and
creating looser networks of states—each come with benefits, but also major
costs. We will not identify a solution to reshape the international
institutional landscape. Rather, our goal is to lead states to better recognize
important trade-offs as they delegate powers to IOs, enabling them to act
Learning, 60 INT’L ORG. 883 (2006); Kristian Skrede Gleditsch & Michael D. Ward, Diffusion and the
International Context of Democratization, 60 INT’L ORG. 911 (2006); Michael J. Gillian, Is Enforcement
Necessary for Effectiveness? A Model of the International Criminal Regime, 60 INT’L ORG. 935 (2006); Jon
Pevehouse & Bruce Russett, Democratic International Governmental Organizations Promote Peace, 60 INT’L
ORG. 969 (2006); Irfan Nooruddin & Joel W. Simmons, The Politics of Hard Choices: IMF Programs and
Government Spending, 60 INT’L ORG. 1001 (2006).
17 See infra Part IV.B. (acknowledging how decision-making bodies based on state representation
– such as the World Health Assembly or the Security Council – never fully resolve horizontal conflict).
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with an enhanced awareness of future consequences. We will draw on
corporate law for specific governance techniques that could ameliorate—
without fully resolving—some of the challenges stemming from the joint
problem.
The motivation behind our project is primarily descriptive, not
normative. Sovereign states delegating power to an IO may find the joint
problem disconcerting—but others may welcome its positive outcomes. For
example, human rights courts might eagerly challenge states’ practices, even
in matters of national security or other sensitive state interests. Similarly, the
World Health Organization (WHO) might advise against travel to states
with emergent epidemics without first consulting with those states, and thus
without first taking these states’ sovereignty concerns as seriously as they
would like.18 Relatedly, the ECJ moved very quickly toward trade
liberalization in the 1970s and 1980s, even though member states would
have retained protectionist barriers for longer, as evidenced by the slow pace
with which they passed directives and regulations to liberalize markets.19
Rapid progress toward human rights, infectious disease eradication, and
trade liberalization are all arguably desirable from several perspectives, but
can be problematic from the perspective of states with more cautious
preferences.
The Article will proceed as follows. Section I will describe the origins
and types of horizontal and vertical conflicts. Section II will develop the
core theoretical argument by explaining how the two conflicts intersect.
Section III will draw on corporate law literature to illustrate how the joint
problem manifests itself in a different institutional context. Section IV will
lay out the distributional consequences associated with the joint problem.
The Conclusion will close with a brief discussion of the ways states can
respond to the joint problem.

II. PRELIMINARY DEFINITIONS: EXAMPLES OF HORIZONTAL AND
VERTICAL CONFLICTS
A. Horizontal Conflict—Distributional Conflict Among States
1. The Origins and Types of Horizontal Conflicts
The primary motivations for pursuing international cooperation are
states’ needs to address various collective action problems and to share the
costs of providing public goods such as peace and security, free trade, and
18See, e.g., Yanzhong Huang, The SARS Epidemic and Its Aftermath in China: A Political Perspective, in
LEARNING FROM SARS—PREPARING FOR THE NEXT OUTBREAK: WORKSHOP SUMMARY 116
(2004).
19 See, e.g., Alec Stone Sweet & Wayne Sandholtz, European Integration and Supranational Governance,
4 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 297 (1997).
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environmental sustainability. Pooling resources allows states to harness
economies of scale, thereby expanding the availability and sharing the costs
of these public goods. It also allows states to better constrain opportunistic
behavior such as free riding.
International cooperation typically makes all states collectively better
off. Yet, various conflicts of interest make even the most beneficial
cooperation challenging. States hold divergent views, for example, as to the
precise sectors of the economy that ought to be liberalized, and the optimal
balance between free trade and social protections.20 They also disagree on
the salience of various security threats, and the appropriate ways to respond
to them. States might agree on the importance of “fair” allocation of
responsibilities for environmental protection, but cannot agree on what this
means when it comes to allocating precise emissions quotas.21 When states
pool their resources to create an IO, each state wants to enjoy at least its fair
share of the goods the IO produces, and to avoid undertaking more
obligations than other members. Relatedly, each state wants to contribute
no more than its fair share of the operating costs of the IO. We call this
distributional conflict over the costs and benefits of joining and governing
an IO a horizontal conflict, or a conflict between “principals,” as it takes place
between legally equal and functionally similar sovereign states.
Sometimes horizontal conflicts manifest as a classic collective action
problem, where individual interest clashes with group interest. Environmental
cooperation efforts often embody this dynamic: each state has an incentive
to defect from cooperation and free ride on others’ efforts to protect the
global commons.22 Establishing genuine cooperation on global climate
change, for instance, would require states to overcome this incentive to free
ride on others’ efforts. Yet, collective action problems are not limited to the
environmental realm. Free riding can even occur in the context of “club
goods” (as opposed to “public goods”) where states should, in principle, be
20 SHAYERAH ILIAS A KHTAR & VIVIAN C. JONES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43387,
TRANSATLANTIC TRADE AND INVESTMENT PARTNERSHIP (TTIP) NEGOTIATIONS 11 (2014);
FERGUSSON ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42694, THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP (TPP)
NEGOTIATIONS AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 4 (2015); Jessica Glenza, TPP Deal: US and 11 Other
Countries Reach Landmark Pacific Trade Pact, GUARDIAN (Oct. 5, 2015, 8:47 AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/oct/05/trans-pacific-partnership-deal-reachedpacific-countries-international-trade.
21 Fiona Harvey, Everything You Need to Know About the Paris Climate Summit and UN Talks,
GUARDIAN (Nov. 20, 2015, 5:38 AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/jun/02/everything-you-need-to-know-about-theparis-climate-summit-and-un-talks; Rowena Mason, Copenhagen Summit: Developing Countries to Challenge
Emissions Limits, TELEGRAPH (Nov. 30, 2009, 8:32 PM),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/earth/copenhagen-climate-change-confe/6694667/Copenhagensummit-developing-countries-to-challenge-emissions-limits.html; Edward Cameron, What is Equity in
the Context of Climate Negotiations?, WORLD RES. INST. (Dec. 14, 2012),
http://www.wri.org/blog/2012/12/what-equity-context-climate-negotiations.
22 See generally Scott Barrett, The Problem of Global Environmental Protection, 6 OXFORD REV. E CON.
POL’Y 68 (1990).
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able to limit the enjoyment of public goods to the IO members.23 In
international trade, for example, free riding can take place within the WTO
itself, although only WTO member states enjoy the benefits of lower trade
barriers, making it impossible for non-members to free ride.24 This is
because all WTO members benefit from a Most-Favored-Nation principle,
which entails each WTO member enjoying the same degree of market
access, irrespective of its willingness to open its markets in return.25 The
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is conversely an example of
an IO that can avoid free riding by limiting its security guarantees to its
members. But many countries still benefit indirectly from its security
umbrella, choosing to enjoy the military protections of NATO without
contributing troops or funds in exchange for more direct and tangible
security guarantees.26
Even when free riding is not a central concern, various distributional
conflicts undermine international cooperation. In these instances, each state
may be better off cooperating than defecting, but may face difficult
questions regarding division of the costs and benefits of cooperation. This
is because each state wants to negotiate a bargain that maximizes its (net)
gains from cooperation. In the IMF, for example, Executive Board
members are often divided by who the Fund should lend to, as well as the
amount of funds that should be dispatched. Such disagreements stem from
states’ varying domestic financial policy considerations (such as the
exposure of their respective private sectors to possible insolvency in some
country) and geopolitical motivations.27 In the UN, distributional conflict
typically focuses on divisions between developed and developing countries.
These countries disagree on whether international obligations should be
universal or differentiated based on the members’ development levels, and
hence capacity to comply.28 Another tension stems from the two-tier
23 Christopher S. Yoo, Copyright and Public Good Economics: A Misunderstood Relation, 155 U. PA. L.
REV. 635, 678 (2007).
24 Glossary Term: Free-rider, WTO,
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/glossary_e/free_rider_e.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2017);
Rodney D. Ludema & Anna Maria Mayda, Do Countries Free Ride on MFN?, 77 J. INT’L ECON. 137,
137–38 (2009).
25
Principles
of
the
Trading
System,
WTO,
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact2_e.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2017).
26 President Trump has repeatedly criticized this alleged free-riding on U.S. security guarantees in
the NATO. For this reason, he has gone as far as to threaten not to respect the security guarantees that
are at the heart of the treaty alliance. See Carol Morello & Adam Taylor, Trump Says US Won’t Rush to
Defend NATO Countries If They Don’t Spend More on Military, WASH. POST (Jul. 21, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/trump-says-us-wont-rush-to-defendnato-countries-if-they-dont-spend-more-on-military/2016/07/21/76c48430-4f51-11e6-a7d813d06b37f256_story.html?utm_term=.d18530e07889.
27 See Mark S. Copelovitch, Master or Servant? Common Agency and the Political Economy of IMF Lending,
54 INT’L STUD. Q. 49, 58 (2010).
28 For discussion of this tension in international law, see Christopher D. Stone, Common but
Differentiated Responsibilities in International Law, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 276, 281–83 (2004).
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membership structure in the UN Security Council. Under this structure,
permanent members can override other member nations because of their
outsized influence over decisions involving international peace and security.
That said, the horizontal conflicts between veto-holding members often
paralyze the Security Council itself.29
Distributional conflicts can be stark even in an IO like the EU, where
membership is perceived as more homogenous, and where member states’
interests are likely to be more aligned as a result. The most pressing
horizontal conflict dividing the EU today stems from the varying strength
of pro-integration parties and Euro-sceptics in domestic political systems.
This disparity causes countries to fundamentally disagree on the extent of
delegation and, therefore, on the ultimate scope of competences possessed
by the EU. Other issues lend themselves to the traditional Right-Left
division, such as states’ disagreements about the optimal balance between
economic and social goals of the EU. Yet, on other issues, conflicts and
coalitions shift depending on the individual member state’s debtor or
creditor status, trade balance, energy infrastructure, share of agricultural
production, socioeconomic challenges, salience of organized labor, or
strength of environmental interests. These varied political and ideological
commitments beget a myriad of horizontal conflicts, and represent a
significant and continuing impediment to collective action within the EU.
Finally, horizontal conflicts are not limited to disagreements between
states over the substantive content of institutionalized cooperation. They
also occur over issues relating to institutional design and governance
features of the IO. For example, states may disagree on how much they will
contribute to the budget, where the IO will be located, which language(s)
the IO will use, which nationals will occupy the most important leadership
positions, and so on. States perceive these features as central in defining
whose preferences the IO will serve, and the types of agendas it will
ultimately advance.
2. Conditions That Exacerbate Horizontal Conflicts
In some instances, horizontal conflicts are particularly severe. We expect
horizontal tensions to be most salient under three conditions: first, when
states seek to resolve collective action problems; second, when cooperation takes
place in the domain of high politics (as opposed to low politics);30 and finally,
29 See, e.g., Julian Borger & Bastien Inzaurralde, Russian Vetoes Are Putting UN Security Council’s
Legitimacy
at
Risk,
Says
US,
GUARDIAN
(Sept.
23,
2015),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/23/russian-vetoes-putting-un-security-councillegitimacy-at-risk-says-us.
30 High politics traditionally refers to cooperation in the national security area, which is considered
particularly sovereignty-sensitive. Low politics refers to less contentious policy areas, such as economic
cooperation.
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where cooperation calls for a greater number of states to be involved. Genuine
collective action problems, such as climate change, always present incentives
for cheating and defection. This breeds distrust among states and deepens
horizontal strains. Similarly, issues of high politics, such as national security,
entail distinctly sovereignty-sensitive issues, making states particularly
fearful of any potential breakdown in relations, and hence wary of one
another. We also expect horizontal conflicts to be more prevalent as more
states come to participate in the cooperative endeavor, as every collective
decision must accommodate a greater number of heterogeneous
preferences.
The failure to create a strong IO to govern one of the most pressing
collective action problems—climate change—speaks to the severity of the
horizontal problem facing states. While the benefits from mitigating climate
change would be enormous, the distributional tensions and incentives to
free ride have caused a continuing stalemate and the emergence of only
weak, non-institutionalized cooperation. Moreover, the number of states
involved in global climate talks has only exacerbated the horizontal problem.
As a result, any regional IO governing climate change, while arguably less
useful, would be easier to establish. It is thus not surprising that the EU has
managed to implement EU-level climate policies,31 but has not persuaded
other states to join the EU at the global level. Whether the IO is designed
to facilitate state cooperation in high versus low politics matters as well.
Horizontal conflicts tend to be especially stark in matters of national
security. Border disputes, for example, always invoke high tensions between
the disputing states, and can escalate to military conflict in the worst cases.32
Here, horizontal conflict can be penetrating even where only two neighbors
are involved. Examples abound, including the Israel-Palestine conflict, one
of the most intractable and long-lasting horizontal conflicts.
3. Ways to Mitigate Horizontal Conflicts
One way to alleviate horizontal conflict is to keep IO membership small,
as smaller IOs can be better tailored to membership preferences. This
strategic choice comes with a cost, however, as the collective benefits of
cooperation are more limited when fewer countries contribute to the
provision of a public good. For example, a free trade agreement between
two countries will entail fewer horizontal conflicts and generate some
economic benefits, but will be inherently less valuable than securing nearly
universal trade within an entity like the WTO—however contested certain
details are.
31
See
generally
European
Climate
Change
Programme,
EUR.
COMMISSION,
http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/eccp/index_en.htm (last updated Jan. 12, 2017).
32
See, e.g., Clashes on Thai-Cambodian Border, BBC NEWS (Apr. 3, 2009),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7980535.stm.
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Another solution is the establishment of executive organs, where some
member states are represented and others are not.33 For instance, the World
Bank has the Board of Executive Directors, the WHO has the Executive
Board, and the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) has its
Council, among others. These executive boards—which facilitate decisionmaking—have a much smaller membership than the organization as a
whole. They also sometimes have positions reserved for states with
particularly strong interests in the IO’s area of activity. For instance, the
“Principle of the Adequate Representation” in the ICAO Council rules calls
for the election of states of “chief importance in air transport,” as well as
the election of states that make the “largest contribution to the provision of
facilities for international civil air navigation.”34 In so doing, these smaller
executive boards begin to resemble corporate boards in ways outlined in
Part III below.
Recognizing this trade-off between the benefits of large membership
and the rising heterogeneity costs of adding additional members, states often
seek to group with like-minded countries. This explains the prevalence and
relative success of regional IOs and institutions with highly restrictive and
relatively homogeneous membership, such as the EU, the Andean Tribunal,
and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD).35 Another way to alleviate horizontal tensions is to place strong
accession conditions on new members to homogenize membership at the
outset.36 For example, the WTO requires new members to adopt significant
trade liberalization measures before entering; the EU subjects each new
member to extensive accession conditions to align the candidate country’s
economic, legal, and political system closely with the EU; and the Council
of Europe requires its members to commit to the protection of fundamental
rights.37
We are deeply grateful to Kristina Daugirdas for all of the ideas in this paragraph.
See Int’l Civ. Aviation Org. [ICAO], Standing Rules of Procedure of the Assembly of the International
Civil
Aviation
Organization,
at
18,
Doc
7600/8
(2014),
http://www.icao.int/publications/Documents/7600_cons_en.pdf.
35 See generally Laurence R. Helfer & Karen J. Alter, The Andean Tribunal of Justice and its Interlocutors:
Understanding Preliminary Reference Patters in the Andean Community, 41 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 871
(2009).
36 See generally Anu Bradford, How International Institutions Evolve, 15 CHI. J. INT’L L. 47 (2014).
37 See, e.g., Heather Grabbe, European Union Conditionality and the “Acquis Communautaire,” 23
INT’L POL. SCI. REV. 249, 252–53 (2002) (examining the EU’s accession conditions and how their
ambiguity increases the EU’s bargaining power in accession negotiations); Raj Bhala, Enter the
Dragon: An Essay on China’s WTO Accession Saga, 15 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1469 (2000) (mapping
the extensive history of negotiations regarding China’s accession to the WTO); Julia Ya Qin,
“WTO-Plus” Obligations and Their Implications for the World Trade Organization Legal System: An
Appraisal of the China Accession Protocol, 37 J. WORLD TRADE 483 (2003) (analyzing the additional
and stringent rules applied to China); Abdur Chowdhury, WTO Accession: What’s in it for Russia?
(William
Davidson
Inst.,
Working
Paper
No.
595,
2003),
http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/handle/2027.42/39981/wp595.pdf (discussing the
history and challenges of Russia’s WTO accession negotiations); See generally North Atlantic Treaty
33
34
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These efforts to preempt looming horizontal conflicts ex ante often fail
ex post, as the states—or the established IO —have only a limited ability to
monitor members’ compliance with entry conditions after accession has
occurred.38 Further, unlike most clubs that choose to limit membership to
like-minded individuals, many IOs have aspirations of universal (or at least
broad) membership, so as to increase gains from cooperation, reduce
free riding, and ensure that their rules enjoy greater legitimacy and
following. This makes horizontal conflicts inevitable. Distributional
conflicts also persist because IOs rarely establish mechanisms to increase
membership homogeneity over time. In small membership clubs,
frequent interaction and socialization can lead to greater similarities in
thinking over time. And in some large groups, notably federations and
nation-states more generally, significant efforts are made to develop a
common history, language, and sense of community and patriotism, all
to foster a shared identity between citizens.39 In turn, this greater
homogeneity alleviates distributional conflict by legitimizing transfers to
fellow citizens. However, to date (with the possible exception of the EU)
IOs have made only limited efforts to foster a sense of shared goals and
community among their members, thereby keeping horizontal conflict a
salient and persistent feature of international cooperation. In all, it is
difficult to limit horizontal conflict without simultaneously reducing the
gains of cooperation.

art. 5, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, 34 U.N.T.S. 243 (requiring potential NATO members accept
the obligations of a reciprocal military alliance, which makes it obligatory for any NATO member
state to militarily aid of any other NATO state under attack); North American Free Trade
Agreement art. 102, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993) (requiring member states to eliminate
trade barriers, promote fair competition, increase investment opportunities, and protect
intellectual property rights); Org. for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD]
Council, Roadmap for the Accession of Chile to the OECD Convention, art. II(A)(ii)(12),
C(2007)100/FINAL (Dec. 3, 2007), http://www.oecd.org/legal/41463062.pdf (requiring that
potential member states to not only share the same fundamental values that the OECD
Convention embodies, but also implement policies that demonstrate these countries’
commitment).
38 See, e.g., Report from the Commission of the European Communities—Greece—Report Prepared in
Accordance with Article 104(3) of the Treaty, SEC (2009) 197 final (Feb. 18, 2009),
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/economic_governance/sgp/pdf/30_edps/10403/2009-02-18_el_104-3_en.pdf; Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council
on Progress in Romania Under the Co-operation and Verification Mechanism, COM (2013) 47 final (Jan.
30, 2013), http://ec.europa.eu/cvm/docs/com_2013_47_en.pdf; U.S. TRADE REP., EXEC.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, REPORT ON WTO ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: RUSSIA (June 2013),
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/06192013%20Russia%20WTO%20Enforcement%20
Report.pdf.
39 Cris Shore, Inventing the 'People's Europe': Critical Approaches to European Community 'Cultural
Policy,' 28 MAN, NEW SERIES 779, 784–787 (1993).
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B. Vertical Conflict—Conflict Between States and Independent IO Bodies
1. The Origins and Types of Vertical Conflicts
One way to mitigate horizontal conflict is by creating an international
organization. As Ken Abbott and Duncan Snidal argue, states create formal
IOs because IO centralization and independence can help reduce conflicts
among states.40 For example, the WTO is designed to facilitate trade
agreements across issue areas so that horizontal conflicts give way to trade
deals that benefit all parties. The WTO is also empowered to hold states
accountable should they defect from those deals at the expense of their
trading partners.
The existence of an independent body capable of acting separate from
member states is a critical feature of an international organization.41 IOs
often have both secretariats and plenary bodies in which states are directly
represented—compare, for example, the UN Secretariat to the UN General
Assembly. When we discuss vertical conflict between member states and
IOs, we are primarily concerned about conflict between member states and
these independent bodies; the more independent the IO organs, the greater
the possibility of vertical conflict.
While delegation to an IO can mitigate horizontal conflict, it often gives
way to another conflict—vertical conflict. Vertical conflict is where states (as
principals) delegate power to an IO (as an agent), and the IO starts to behave
opportunistically and in a manner contrary to the preferences of the member
states that empowered it. This opportunistic behavior by an agent is often
called “agency slack.”42 We build on existing work on principal-agent
conflict in IOs by illustrating how having multiple states as principals, as
opposed to a single principal, further aggravates this conflict.
The vertical conflict between states collectively on the one hand and
IOs on the other begins the moment IOs are created. It is considered a
common phenomenon, stemming from states delegating important tasks to
independent and centralized bureaucracies.43 IOs’ undesirable behaviors can
take many forms, including shirking their responsibilities, or allocating
See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 14, at 3.
JOSE E. ALVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS LAW-MAKERS 6 (2006) (noting
that in identifying IOs’ distinguishing legal characteristics “there is wide agreement among lawyers that
three elements are important, namely (1) establishment by international agreement between states; (2)
of at least one organ distinct from member states and capable of so acting; and (3) under international
law.”); see generally Kristina Daugirdas, How and Why International Law Binds International Organizations, 57
HARV. J. INT’L L. 325 (2016) (discussing how jus cogens, general international law, and treaties all bind
international organizations); Kristina Daugirdas, Reputation and the Responsibility of International
Organizations 25 EUR. J. INT’L L. 991 (2015) (exploring why it is significant for all IO organs to comply
with international law in order to maintain their reputations).
42 See generally DELEGATION AND AGENCY IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, supra note
16.
43 Alvarez, supra note 41, at 9–29.
40

41 See
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resources to initiatives not initially envisioned by the founding states. Some
forms of agency slack—such as when IO staff obtain higher pay for less
work than their principals called for—are widely criticized. Other forms of
agency slack, however, are praised by other actors, while displeasing to stateprincipals. For example, many praised World Health Organization doctors’
decisions to “[go] on the offensive against China,” investigate SARS, and
issue travel advisories without respecting diplomatic protocol and the
WHO’s own rules.44 Similarly, environmentalists have praised WTO
appellate body decisions to interpret free trade rules liberally to include
environmental concerns, even though key member states argued
otherwise.45
The extent of vertical conflict depends on the degree of delegation that
has taken place. As a result, the agent’s operating space—its “zone of
discretion”—is often the most consequential strategic decision the
principals undertake when they first create the IO. In law and economics
terms, this zone is determined by the sum of various competences explicitly
(or implicitly) delegated to the IO, minus the control instruments the
principals establish to curtail the agent’s discretion.46 A principal’s capacity
to control the agent is inversely proportional to the magnitude of the agent’s
zone of discretion.47
Different IOs enjoy varying degrees of discretion. Some IOs possess
very limited powers, and remain largely or entirely within the tight control
of the principals. For example, the UN Secretariat exercises little
independent control over UN Security Council decisions, although it does
enjoy significant administrative powers in other areas.48 Each resolution
reflects an outcome firmly rooted in the Council members’ domestic policy
positions at any time. The UN Secretariat does not decide whether to
impose economic sanctions or undertake military action.49 The UN also
does not contribute troops to missions.50 In these instances, the main
purpose of the UN as an IO is to provide an umbrella under which the

44 Andrew P. Cortell & Susan Peterson, Dutiful Agents, Rogue Actors, or Both? Staffing, Voting
Rules, and Slavk in the WHO and WTO, in DELEGATION AND A GENCY IN INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS 255, 270 (Darren G. Hawkins, David A. Lake, Daniel L. Nielson & Michael J.
Tierney eds., 2006).
45 See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp
Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS58/AB/R (adopted Nov. 6, 1998).
46 Alec Stone Sweet & Thomas Brunell, Constructing a Supranational Constitution, in THE JUDICIAL
CONSTRUCTION OF EUROPE 45 (Alec Stone Sweet ed., 2004).
47 Id.
48 See generally RICHARD CAPLAN, A NEW TRUSTEESHIP?: THE INTERNATIONAL
ADMINISTRATION OF WAR TORN TERRITORIES (2002).
49 Those powers belong to the Security Council. See U.N. Charter arts. 39, 41 & 47; see also
Functions and Powers, U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL, http://www.un.org/en/sc/about/functions.shtml
(last visited Dec. 1, 2017).
50 Although that was envisioned by the UN Charter. See U.N. Charter art. 43.
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horizontal conflicts can play out in a predictable and rule-based
environment.
The EU is different. EU institutions enjoy a large array of supra-national
competences and independent decision-making powers. In some areas of
EU law, such as trade or competition policy, delegation to the Commission
is nearly complete, giving it almost unlimited discretion.51 The Commission
also has full discretion to bring infringement proceedings against member
states that violate EU law.52 This power (and frequent practice) of the
Commission to sue member states makes it difficult to even portray the
Commission as an agent within the control of the principals that initially
created it.53 The extent of delegation to the WTO, on the other hand, falls
somewhere in the middle: the process of negotiating trade agreements
remains largely member driven,54 with the WTO Secretariat carrying little
influence beyond convening members for trade talks. At the same time, the
WTO dispute settlement mechanism with a permanent Appellate Body
entails significant delegation, vesting it with the authority to impose large
costs on individual states.55
IO discretion, combined with the limited ability of states to monitor and
sanction the IO, are the key preconditions for a vertical conflict to emerge.
Yet vertical conflicts can manifest in many ways. For example, IO
secretariats typically request bigger budgets than member states are willing
to allocate, often call for more powers at the supra-national level than
member states want to grant, and even take on projects many member states
disagree with. Moreover, as IOs mature, they tend to gain confidence in
their ability to self-govern, which leads them to gradually develop their own
agendas. As a consequence, their agendas start to diverge from the original
purpose underlying the delegation and the IO’s existence. Some call this
“mission creep,” a term used to describe the UN peacekeeping mission in
Somalia, which evolved from a small-scale humanitarian mission to a fatal
military confrontation and campaign to effect long-term stability in the wartorn country.56 The WTO has likewise been accused of straying beyond its
51 See, e.g., Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art.
207, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 47.
52
Legal
Enforcement:
The
Infringements
Procedure,
EUR.
COMMISSION,
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/legal/law/procedure.htm (last updated June 8, 2016).
53 See Giandomenico Majone, Two Logics of Delegation: Agency and Fiduciary Relations in EU Governance,
2 EUR. UNION POL. 103, 103–05 (2001). This has led some commentators to describe the EU
Commission as a “trustee” rather than as an agent as its powers exceed those of a typical agent. See id.
at 114–15.
54 Understanding the WTO: The Organization, WTO,
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org1_e.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2017).
55 See, e.g., Canada Awarded Right to $1B in WTO Trade Sanctions Against U.S. over Meat-Labelling
Rules, CBC NEWS (Dec. 7, 2015, 1:45 PM), http://www.cbc.ca/news/business/canada-u-s-meatlabelling-wto-1.3354048.
56 Ben Zimmer, ‘Mission Creep’ Crawls out of the ‘90s, WALL ST. J. (June 27, 2014),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/the-long-voyage-of-mission-creep-1403901268.
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original mission, as it has expanded its agenda to areas beyond traditional
trade matters, such as intellectual property protection.57 Critics can also
reasonably characterize many EU actions as mission creep, citing the
expansion of its competences from economic to social policies, its recent
forays into invasive financial regulation, and its allocation of migrant
quotas.58 This systematic growth in EU competences and move toward an
“even-closer union” was a central concern motivating the U.K. referendum
that triggered the country’s impending exit from the EU.59
Agency slack does not only come in the form of an IO drifting from its
original mission. The agent can also behave opportunistically within the
confines of its core policy area. The IMF staff, for example, is accused of
pursuing unduly large loans, coupled with excessive conditions.60 In doing
so, the IMF staff is perceived to engage in rent-seeking in an effort to
maximize its power, autonomy and influence, all at the expense of the
Fund’s policy objectives and resources.61
International courts and tribunals can also become wayward agents.
Independent tribunals sometimes make decisions that not only displease the
losing party, but also the member states that formed the tribunal. For
example, Rachel Cichowski, who analyzed ECJ case law in the social policy
and environmental area,62 found not only that citizen suits challenging
national legislation typically succeed, and thus displease the member state
being sued, but that other states’ interventions to guide the ECJ are often
ignored by the ECJ. Instead of aligning with intervening member states, the
ECJ is much more likely to align with the positions of another supranational actor: the EU Commission. This happens in over 90% of cases
studied.63 Meanwhile, Eric Posner notes the decline of member states’ use

THIERRY BAUDET, THE S IGNIFICANCE OF BORDERS 136 (2012).
Arnaldo Abruzzini, EU Social Dialogue ‘Mission Creep,’ EURACTIV (Mar. 5, 2015),
https://www.euractiv.com/section/social-europe-jobs/opinion/eu-social-dialogue-mission-creep/;
Harry Wilson, ‘Mission Creep’ Fears Surround EU Watchdogs, TELEGRAPH (Sept. 5, 2010),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/banksandfinance/7982936/Mission-creep-fearssurround-EU-watchdogs.html.
59 Palmeri, supra note 1.
60 EUR. NETWORK ON DEBT & DEV., WORLD BANK AND IMF CONDITIONALITY: A
DEVELOPMENT INJUSTICE 18–19 (2006),
http://www.eurodad.org/uploadedfiles/whats_new/reports/eurodad_world_bank_and_imf_conditi
onality_report.pdf; China and the World: Yuan for All, ECONOMIST (Jan. 29, 2015),
http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21641203-chinas-loans-foundering-governments-mayseem-challenge-imf-biggest-risks-are; Ian Vásquez, The International Monetary Fund: Challenges and
Contradictions, CATO INST. (Sept. 28, 1999), https://www.cato.org/publications/congressionaltestimony/international-monetary-fund-challenges-contradictions.
61 See Copelovitch, supra note 27, at 54.
62 See generally CICHOWSKI, supra note 9.
63 See id. at 137 tbl.4.5, 139 tbl.4.6; Rachel A. Cichowski, Women’s Rights, the European Court, and
Supranational Constitutionalism, 38 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 489, 495 tbl.1, 497 tbl.2 (2004).
57
58
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of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) due to this partial track record of
judges.64
2. Conditions That Exacerbate Vertical Conflicts
The severity of vertical conflict varies across different areas of
cooperation and strategic situations. Vertical conflicts are prone to be
especially acute when the mission of the IO is broad or loosely defined. This is
because a broad IO mission allows agents to pick and choose among various
priorities, where mission creep can set in quickly. Vertical problems are also
likely to be acute when the IO is charged with a task requiring specific
expertise. In such a context, IO staffs often enjoy significant informational
advantages vis-à-vis state-principals, and can use them to pursue agent
priorities, like greater internationalization. For example, the European
Commission antitrust decisions involve highly technical analysis, making the
Commission’s antitrust policy less amenable to state control—whether ex
ante or ex post. Accordingly, these types of decisions are often seen as highly
intrusive, with wide and troubling consequences for some.
In addition, heterogeneity of preferences among state principals could
worsen the vertical conflict. Mark Copelovitch shows empirically how the
IMF is able to exploit the divisions among its five most powerful
shareholders, engaging in more extensive lending in instances where the “G5” remain most divided.65 In his model, the preferences of the less important
IMF shareholders are irrelevant, suggesting that it is the heterogeneity
among the key players that matters.
3. Ways to Mitigate Vertical Conflicts
Both rationalist and constructivist scholarship explain why delegation
entails significant costs. The fear of agency slack may lead principals to
confer carefully delineated powers to the agent. Yet such a strategy directly
reduces the benefits of delegation. If the WTO’s powers were strictly
confined to furthering liberalization of trade in goods, all the benefits
associated with the conclusion of trade talks on services and intellectual
property (IP)—the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)
agreements—would be lost. Similarly, budgetary control is often a doubleedged sword for member states to use. Curtailing the agent’s budget may
effectively restrain the agent, but it also denies the agent the requisite

64 See Eric A. Posner, The Decline of the International Court of Justice (John M. Olin Program in Law
& Econ., Working Paper No. 233, 2004).
65 Copelovitch, supra note 27.
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resources to carry out the tasks principals have delegated to it.66 If France,
for instance, is unhappy with the way the European Commission conducts
Common Agricultural Policy, the budget cuts would not only penalize and
disempower the Commission, but also stymie the objectives of a policy area
that France strongly supports. Thus, budgetary control is only available
when principals are willing to accept the incidental adverse effects such
budgetary controls cause to the policy objectives they endorse.
While game-theoretic models lend some alternative ways to reduce these
agency costs, such as selecting agents with particular traits, monitoring them
closely, rewarding compliance and punishing non-compliance, these
techniques are very hard to effect without significantly reducing the benefits
of delegation.67 Yet, any principal-agent model presumes that when
delegation takes place, principals must anticipate ex ante that the expected
benefits of such delegation must outweigh the costs.
We argue that these difficulties, which increase the costs of delegation,
are greater in IOs than other bureaucracies, because IOs have multiple
principals with competing desires, and because IOs have large and
independent bureaucracies with their own institutional cultures. Both of
these factors—multiple principals and IO institutional cultures—have been
bracketed by the most current research on delegation to IOs, including the
2006 Hawkins et al. edited volume, and the related special issue in IO.68
More specifically, Mona Lyne, Daniel Nielson, and Michael Tierney, the
foremost authors examining the question of multiple principals, recommend
modeling the states constituting IOs as a single collective principal with a
single ideal point, rather than as multiple principals with distinct ideal
points.69 While this approach would simplify formal modeling, it would also
set aside some of the key features that make delegation to IOs so
challenging. Similarly, these authors—and others in the rationalist tradition
more generally—warn against “attributing primary causal weight for IO
behavior to organizational culture or charismatic leadership.”70 Against
these warnings, we intend to develop such arguments below.
Terry M. Moe, An Assessment of the Positive Theory of ‘Congressional Dominance,’ 12 LEGIS.
STUD. Q. 475, 487 (1987); Mark A. Pollack, Delegation, Agency, and Agenda Setting in the
European Community, 51 INT’L ORG. 99, 117 (1997).
67 See D. RODERICK KIEWIET & MATHEW D. M CCUBBINS, THE LOGIC OF DELEGATION:
CONGRESSIONAL PARTIES AND THE A PPROPRIATIONS PROCESS 25 (1991); DELEGATION AND
AGENCY IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 16, at 25.
68 DELEGATION AND AGENCY IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 16;
Simmons, Dobbin & Garrett, supra note 16; Elkins, Guzman & Simmons, supra note 16; Swank,
supra note 16; Lee & Strang, supra note 16; Gleditsch & Ward, supra note 16; Gilligan, supra note
16; Pevehouse & Russett, supra note 16; Nooruddin & Simmons, supra note 16.
69 Mona M. Lyne, Daniel L. Nielson & Michael J. Tierney, Who Delegates? Alternative Models of
Principals in Development Aid, in DELEGATION AND AGENCY IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
41–42 (Darren G. Hawkins, David A. Lake, Daniel L. Nielson & Michael J. Tierney eds., 2006).
70 Id. at 43.
66
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***
The next section will move beyond examining horizontal and vertical
conflicts, either in isolation or relative to each other. Rather, the next section
will explain how particular institutional design choices common to IOs—
such as super-majority voting rules, international personnel selection and
promotion rules, location choices, and the scope of the IO mission—
significantly exacerbate the costs of delegation, and hence the vertical
conflict. We also explain why these seemingly problematic institutional
design features are so common: they were put in place when the IOs were
created to resolve what was seen as a more pressing conflict—the horizontal
conflict among states.

III. THEORY: HOW HORIZONTAL AND VERTICAL CONFLICTS
INTERSECT
A. Institutions That Help Solve Distributional Conflict Worsen Agency Conflict
The following paragraphs discuss some institutional forms that are very
common to IOs, such as voting rules, the rules governing IO staff, the
location of the IO, and the scope of the IO mandate. For each institutional
feature, the discussion aims to establish two points. First, it aims to show
how many of these institutional features were erected to help solve the
distributional conflicts among states at the time the IO was established.
Next, it aims to show how these institutional features can worsen the vertical
conflict between member states collectively, and between the IO’s
independent bodies. We argue this conflict will likely worsen over time as
the IO gains stability, develops its own organizational culture, and expands
its powers and budget.
1. Voting Rules and IO Decision-Making
Of the many institutional design features of IOs, voting rules are an
appropriate place to start, as they clearly reflect individual states’ power and
control over the organization. Two decision-making rules involving voting
are very common to IOs. First, IO decisions are rarely made with simple
majorities of states, but typically require super-majorities, and often
unanimity. Second is the principle of one-state-one-vote. Both rules, we
argue, were initially established to allow states interested in protecting their
sovereignty to minimize the horizontal conflicts with other states involved
in the international organization. Over time, however, we show how these
rules worsen states’ collective ability to resolve vertical conflict, and allow
wayward secretariats and tribunals to proceed on initiatives that states
collectively may not desire.
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Historically, unanimity was the default decision-making rule in IOs.71
While many organizations have relaxed this rule to require only a supermajority, it is still uncommon to find bodies with simple majority voting, the
UN General Assembly constituting a notable exception. Moreover, even
bodies that formally allow decisions to proceed without unanimous consent
of their members, such as the European Union, the World Trade
Organization, the IMF and the World Bank, in fact typically try to reach
consensus. When IOs are formed, unanimity and super-majority rules give
states increased confidence that other states will not easily be able to trample
over their national interests. Indeed, the more diverse an international
organization’s membership, the more likely it is to require all of its decisions
to be made unanimously.72
Unanimity also has well-recognized costs. Most notably, it creates biases
in favor of the status quo, and frequently leads IOs to inaction. The failure
of the League of Nations to stop World War II is a tragic illustration of
status quo bias. In recognition of the perils of this bias, UN Security Council
rules do not require unanimity, except among the five permanent Council
Members. Similarly, a super-majority support among all fifteen Council
Members is required. However, even this requirement may be too
burdensome. Many critics argue it leaves the Security Council unable to
intervene to prevent grave humanitarian catastrophes.73 Moreover, such
unanimity rules have deadlocked the WTO negotiations launched back in
2001, leading states to formally abandon trade talks in 2015.74 The WTO’s
established practice is to require consensus despite the existence of supermajority voting rules in the IO’s charter, which has all but paralyzed the
institution as membership has grown and consensus has become harder to
reach.
We acknowledge the costs embedded in the frequent deadlocks and
status quo bias that follow from sovereignty-protecting voting rules. At the
same time, our critique of super-majority and unanimity requirements is
different: we argue these high thresholds empower independent IO
secretariats and tribunals, at the expense of the member states of the
organization. In other words, once power has been delegated to one of these
bodies, it becomes difficult for member states to muster the requisite votes
to repudiate a wayward agent. For example, many ECJ decisions have
dismayed EU member states by interpreting EU treaties in ways that move
71 WERNER J. FELF, ROBERT S. JORDAN & LEON HURWITZ, INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH (3d ed. 1994).
72 Daniel J. Blake & Autumn Lockwood Payton, Decision Making in International Organizations:
An Interest Based Approach to Voting Rule Selection 26 (Jan. 9, 2009) (working paper) (on file with
author).
73 Borger & Inzaurralde, supra note 29.
74 Shawn Donnan, Trade Talks Lead to ‘Death of Doha and Birth of New WTO,’ FIN. TIMES (Dec.
20, 2015), https://www.ft.com/content/97e8525e-a740-11e5-9700-2b669a5aeb8.
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power away from national capitals and toward EU institutions.75 However,
it has been almost impossible for EU governments to correct the ECJ’s
course, since course-correcting the ECJ would often require legislative
action in the form of a treaty change, and hence an extraordinary degree of
consensus among member states.76
Another peculiar IO decision-making feature is that many IOs couple a
one-state-one-vote rule with a rule requiring each state to contribute to the
organization’s budget roughly in proportion to the state’s wealth. The onestate-one-vote principal is common to IOs—each member of the UN
General Assembly, the WTO, the World Health Organization’s Assembly,
and the International Atomic Energy Agency, among other bodies, gets the
same voting power.77 This allocation is not exactly democratic, as a citizen
of the Maldives gets roughly a thousand times more voting power than a
citizen of China.78 Nevertheless, it is often put in place to guarantee notions
of formal sovereign equality, thereby ensuring states joining the organization
that their interests will not easily be superseded by those of larger states.
After all, if votes were allocated based on population, China and India would
control the global IOs, which would dissuade other states from joining such
bodies.79 That said, in the one IO most closely resembling a federation—
the European Union—votes have been accorded in greater proportion to
national populations over time.
Importantly, the one-state-one-vote rule (or even voting in proportion
to population) is typically combined with a rule calling for richer states to
contribute more to the organization’s budget. In 2010, for example, the 165
poorest UN members contributed only 7% of the organization’s budget,
despite having a clear majority of votes in UN bodies.80
This mismatch between voting and financing creates another supermajority hurdle: for an IO proposal to go forward, it needs the support of
75 For discussion of an activist ECJ, see Rachel A. Cichowski, Integrating the Environment: The
European Court and the Construction of Supranational Policy, 5 J. EUR. POL’Y 387, 387 (1998); Alter, supra
note 8; Weiler, supra note 8.
76 See generally Geoffrey Garrett, R. Daniel Kelemen & Heiner Schultz, The European Court of Justice,
National Governments, and Legal Integration in the European Union, 52 INT’L ORG. 149 (1998).
77 Additional (but obviously non-exhaustive) examples of the one-state-one-vote configuration
include the Organization of American States General Assembly, the Congress of the World
Meteorological Organization, International Whaling Commission, and the assembly of the
International Civil Aviation Organization. See Charter of the Organization of American States art. 34,
Apr. 30, 1948, 119 U.N.T.S. 3; Convention of the World Meteorological Organization art. 10, Oct. 11,
1947, 77 U.N.T.S. 143; Convention on International Civil Aviation art. 48(b), Dec. 7, 1944, 15 U.N.T.S.
295; INT’L WHALING COMM’N, RULES OF PROCEDURE AND FINANCIAL REGULATIONS § E(1) (Oct.
10, 2014), https://archive.iwc.int/pages/view.php?ref=3605&k=.
78 Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Globalization’s Democratic Deficit: How to Make International Institutions More
Accountable, 80 FOREIGN A FF. 2, 4 (2001).
79 Id.
80 MARJORIE ANN BROWNE & LUISA BLANCHFIELD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30605,
UNITED NATIONS REGULAR BUDGET CONTRIBUTIONS: MEMBERS COMPARED, 1990–2010 23
(2013).
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both the states that formally vote on proposals, and the rich states that
effectively control the budget. As with other super-majority requirements,
this makes it harder to initially delegate tasks, but also makes it harder to roll
back IO efforts that many members do not like. As such, budget
negotiations in the United Nations and EU are typically protracted and
painful affairs, precisely because major financial contributors leverage
budget negotiations as a tool to exercise greater control over the
organization, while the IO Secretariat, and sometimes smaller states, resist.
Conversely, in IOs where voting and financing are more closely aligned,
such as the IMF and World Bank, there are fewer conflicts over the budget.
The mismatch between formal votes and budget negotiations can lead
IOs to move forward with policies that many member states oppose. EU
budget expenditures toward the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) is one
prominent example. Put in place to support French farmers in 1958, these
farming subsidies constitute over 40% of the EU budget today,81 and
have been highly criticized ever since as wasteful and poorly designed
agricultural policy.82 They have also been criticized as costly to European
consumers, unfair to EU states with small agricultural sectors, and
detrimental to the developing world.83 While CAP has indeed been
slightly modified, it still has a cost exceeding forty billion euro annually,
despite the EU only having fourteen million farmers (and a total
population of 740 million).84 Many member states have tried fighting
CAP, both in the Council of Ministers and EU budget negotiations.
Margaret Thatcher’s 1984 budget negotiations were perhaps the sharpest
and most successful, but even Thatcher failed in radically reforming this
policy. Instead, she merely succeeded in reducing the U.K.’s contribution
to the CAP budget.85 The decades-long continuation of controversial
policies like CAP underscores how difficult it can be to alter the course
of an IO, in part because of voting rules requiring extraordinary
consensus among member states, and because of protracted battles over
financing the IO’s (already disputed) mission.
81 See CAP Expenditure in the Total EU Expenditure, EUR. COMMISSION (Mar. 2017),
http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/cap-post-2013/graphs/graph1_en.pdf; Charlie Dunmore, Farm
Subsidies Still Get Top Share of EU Austerity Budget, REUTERS, Feb. 8, 2013,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/08/eu-budget-agricultureidUSL5N0B82UW20130208.
82 Posner, supra note 64.
83
Common
Agricultural
Policy,
WIKIPEDIA,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_Agricultural_Policy (last updated Nov. 20, 2017).
84 The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and Agriculture in Europe—Frequently Asked Questions, EUR.
COMMISSION (June 26, 2013), http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/faq/index_en.htm.
85 See Bruno Waterfield, EU Tries to Grab £6bn from Britain’s EU Rebate, TELEGRAPH (Nov. 15,
2012), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/eu/9679833/EU-tries-to-grab-6bnfrom-Britains-EU-rebate.html.
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2. Rules Governing IO Staff and Leaders
Staffing choices are another crucial aspect of IO operations. Modern IO
staffing rules are like those of many national bureaucracies, insofar as they
involve competitive examinations for entry, and long-term tenure thereafter.
In other ways, however, IOs have unique staffing rules, including hiring
rules that encourage a nationally diverse staff, privileging of people who
speak many of the IO’s working languages,86 and committing IO staff to be
loyal to the IO rather than to their state of nationality.87 The UN staff, for
example, consists of career civil servants from all of its member states.88 The
staff generally shares an extensive background in international affairs, and a
certain commitment to multinationalism and international order, as
evidenced by their career choice. The UN’s competitive salary structure and
commitment to the so-called “noblemaire principle,” which sets the UN
career civil servants’ salaries by reference to the highest-paying national civil
services, ensures that it can draw civil servants from all over the world.89
UN recruitment further emphasizes the importance of international
experience, foreign language skills, and an ability to work on multicultural
teams.90
Political bargains often determine how IO heads will be selected. These
rules, we argue, were designed to help states protect against being placed in
a disadvantaged position in subsequent interactions with other states. For
example, the U.S. wanted to know in future disputes with France that a
neutral arbiter, rather than a French national who was loyal to the French
state, would make key decisions that affected all members. Similarly, insofar
as IO jobs are plum positions, many states wanted to get their fair share of
these rewards. We argue, however, that these rules sharpen the conflict
between states collectively, on the one hand, and independent IO bodies,
on the other. Over time, IO staffs form a multi-national and multi-lingual
community, which orient themselves toward the IO and its supra-national
goals, and away from the agendas of national capitals.
IO rules typically specify that personnel must come from many
countries, namely because when states form an IO, they anticipate disputes
with other member states, and want a neutral body to adjudicate such
86 U.N. Charter art. 101; William J. Aceves, Critical Jurisprudence and International Legal Scholarship:
A Study of Equitable Distribution, 39 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 299, 354–359 (2001).
87 See generally, JOSE E. ALVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS L AW-MAKERS (2006);
see also THOMAS FRANCK, NATION A GAINST NATION: WHAT HAPPENED TO THE UN DREAM AND
WHAT THE US CAN DO ABOUT IT (1985).
88 See Secretary-General’s Bulletin, Staff Rules and Staff Regulations of the United Nations 93, 95,
ST/SGB/2014/1 (Jan. 1, 2014).
89
Salaries
&
Post
Adjustment,
UNITED
NATIONS,
http://www.un.org/Depts/OHRM/salaries_allowances/salary.htm (last visited Dec. 2, 2017).
90 As an example for a posting for career opportunities at UN, see International Professional Staff,
UNHCR, http://www.unhcr.org/pages/4dca99626.html (last visited Dec. 2, 1027).
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disputes. States may also want the presence of someone from their own state
to articulate their national point of view to decision-makers. The rules
governing the composition of the International Court of Justice illustrate
this concern: each country can have only one judge appointed to the ICJ,91
and parties to a dispute have the option of appointing a judge from their
country to the court, if one is not already present.92 Similarly, each EU
country gets to appoint one commissioner and one judge to both the ECJ
and General Court. The IMF staff consists of 2,400 members representing
143 countries.93 These engrained practices show how many countries see IO
appointments as valuable goods to be distributed fairly among member
states.
Even IO members that initially seem most loyal to their home
jurisdiction may find themselves serving the IO’s goals instead of, or in
parallel with, the goals of their home constituency. For example, members
of the European Parliament—the democratically elected body to which EU
member states delegate legislative functions—are chosen as a result of
national elections.94 French people vote among the French candidates, and
Spanish people among the Spanish candidates, both competing for
predetermined quotas reserved for France and Spain in the European
Parliament.95 However, after being elected, important committee
assignments and other leadership positions within the European Parliament
are chosen by European-level parties, which carry agendas removed from
individual national priorities. Accordingly, a French conservative member
of the European Parliament (MEP) can no longer maximize his influence
by maximizing the French interest at every turn. Instead, he must cater to
the preferences of the European People’s Party, whose leaders hail from
different EU member states. These European-level political organizations
will determine the career prospects of this MEP once elected, thus creating
incentives for MEPs to substitute their narrow national interests for broader
European agendas.
IO personnel are typically career civil-servants within the IO; they are
not seconded from national bureaucracies for short stints. This move from
multi-national to international staffing was pioneered by the League of
Nations and its contemporary institutions—the International Labor
Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 3, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031.
Id. at art. 31.
93 Copelovitch, supra note 27, at 56.
94 It is debatable whether the EP can be modeled as an agent of the MSs. The MSs created the
institution and delegated powers to it. At the same time, since 1979, the MSs no longer select the
members of the EP. Instead, they are elected by national electorate and are hence accountable for the
citizens as their principals more directly.
95 Results of the 2014 European Elections, EUR. PARLIAMENT,
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/elections2014-results/en/seats-member-state-absolut.html (last
visited Dec. 2, 2017).
91
92
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Organization and Permanent Court of International Justice.96 Before that,
IO secretariats were generally staffed by temporary secondments from
national administrations.97 Indeed, in some cases, like in the Universal Postal
Union, IO staff is recruited and organized on a national basis under the
administrative control of individual governments.98 And while selection of
IO staff on the basis of competitive examinations is now commonplace, it
was controversial at least until the 1970s, as developing countries and
countries affiliated with the Soviet Union wanted more freedom to use IO
staffing as a way to offer patronage to political allies.99
While rules creating a multi-national, independent staff help states
ensure the IO is not controlled by a single powerful country, they also
weaken the position of states collectively vis-à-vis the IO bureaucracy. Such
rules can lead to the selection of persons who have pro-international values,
and who are thus presumed to be more effective and successful
professionals in the international setting. These individuals, however, often
have weaker attachments to the nation state. Also, by interacting primarily
with people from foreign nationalities over time, IO personnel might
become more internationally-minded than when initially hired. Moreover,
once promotion opportunities depend less on political connections at home,
and more on integration within a multi-national bureaucracy, IO staff have
a natural career incentive to pay less attention to politics at home, and more
attention to the organization’s internationalist goals. For example, due to
selection, socialization, career, and other reasons, personnel from the
European Commission are far more likely to feel attached to the European
identity than other Europeans.100 According to Liesbet Hooghe’s survey
research, while over 40% of Europeans in general felt no attachment to
Europe and only felt attached to their nation states, 0% of European
Commission staff felt the same absence of attachment.101 To take another
example, Antje Wiener conducted wide-ranging interviews in London,
Berlin, and Brussels—three prominent political arenas in which IO elites
operate.102 She found that compared to elites stationed in London or Berlin,
and controlling for nationality, elites stationed in Brussels made very
different associations.103 Wiener concluded that this more “diffused” and

96 Henri Reymond, The Staffing of the United Nations Secretariat: A Continuing Discussion, 21 INT’L
ORG. 751, 753 (1967).
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Id. at 757–61.
100 See supra note 77.
101 Liesbet Hooghe, Several Roads Lead to International Norms, but Few Via International Socialization:
A Case Study of the European Commission, 59 INT’L ORG. 861, 874 (2005).
102 See generally ANTJE WIENER, THE INVISIBLE CONSTITUTION OF POLITICS: CONTESTED
NORMS AND INTERNATIONAL ENCOUNTERS (2008).
103 Id. at 192.
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“flexible” pattern of associative norms found in Brussels is indicative of
the deconstruction of national identities.104
Several additional IO rules advance this tendency among IO staff to
develop an internationalist identity and discard loyalty to their home
state. For example, IO hiring typically gives preferences to people who
speak multiple languages, especially the working or official languages of
the IOs. This helps create internationalist identities. Additionally, many
IOs have rules requiring personnel to be loyal to the organization—not
to their home country. For example, the ECJ does not issue dissenting
opinions, so as to shield the judges from pressures to support their
national positions.105 This enhances neutrality, but reinforces prior
tendencies of IOs to develop loyalty to the institution, and away from
national capitals. In all, these rules advance IO neutrality and the
resolution of distributional conflicts among member states, but worsen
states’ collective ability to control the IO.
Some IOs’ hiring rules require both national diversity and
professional homogeneity. For example, doctors dominate WHO
positions, while economists dominate the World Bank and IMF.106 In
general, professional specialization both increases the advantages of
delegation and worsens the agency problem. The more specialized an
agent becomes vis-à-vis its principal, the better able it is to control the
information reaching the principal and lead politicians monitoring the
bodies toward adopting policies preferred by the technical staff. In the
IO context in particular, national diversity, combined with professional
uniformity, can increase ties among staff of different nationalities, and
increase the sense of an internationalist IO mission, separate from the
concerns of national leaders.
One way states can maintain control over wayward IO bureaucracies
is through control of IO leadership. IO heads are typically picked on the
basis of political criteria, and they do not always have long tenures with

Id.
Roland Flamini, Judicial Reach: The Ever-Expanding European Court of Justice, WORLD AFF.
(Nov./Dec. 2012), http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/judicial-reach-ever-expandingeuropean-court-justice.
106 Staff of International Civil Servants, INT’L MONETARY FUND,
https://www.imf.org/external/about/staff.htm (last visited Dec. 2, 2017) (“The IMF currently
employs about 2,400 staff, half of whom are economists.”); About WHO: WHO People and Offices,
WHO, http://www.who.int/about/structure/en/ (last visited Dec. 2, 2017) (“In addition to medical
doctors, public health specialists, scientists and epidemiologists, WHO staff include people trained to
manage administrative, financial, and information systems, as well as experts in the fields of health
statistics, economics and emergency relief.”).
104
105
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the organization.107 These appointment rules create incentives for IO
heads to pay more heed to the concerns of national capitals, and arguably
give IO heads less time to be socialized into internationalist cultures.
That said, IO leadership positions, like IO staff positions, are typically
allocated on the basis of national bargains. For example, a European
typically heads the IMF, while an American typically heads the World
Bank.108 According to scholars of delegation, this means the pool of
qualified candidates is shallower than it otherwise would be, so it is hard
for states to pick agents that best represent their collective preferences.109
Moreover, because IOs are highly specialized, it is often the case that
IO heads have long prior experiences with the organization and its
internationalist tendencies. A recent battle over the head of the European
Commission illustrates that the selection of IO heads may not offer
powerful states much leeway to select loyal candidates and thus control
the organization. Most recently, Jean-Claude Juncker was chosen to head
the powerful EU Commission.110 A powerful EU state—the U.K.—
opposed his candidacy very publicly and forcefully, threatening to hasten a
referendum on exit from the EU should he be selected.111 According to then
U.K. Prime Minister David Cameron, Juncker’s extensive European
experience was not a qualification, but a reason to disqualify him, as it made
him more likely to support further EU integration, rather than support the
idea of key powers remaining with national capitals.112 Nevertheless, these
arguments did not carry the day. Despite a strong crisis of EU legitimacy, a
powerful Eurocrat was chosen to lead the Commission. In his first years in
office, Juncker has already exhibited inclinations our theory would predict:
he is methodically expanding the reach of the European institutions to
address both the migration and financial crises, he is acquiring new and
controversial powers for the Commission, and he is consequently deepening
vertical conflict, much to the dismay of critics within member states.

107 MILES KAHLER, LEADERSHIP SELECTION IN THE MAJOR MULTINATIONALS 51 (2001);
Jacob Katz Cogan, Representation and Power in International Organization: The Operational Constitution and Its
Critics, 103 AM. J. INT'L L. 209, 209–11 (2009).
108 KAHLER, supra note 107.
109 Lyne, Nielson & Tierney, supra note 69 at 42.
110 Ian Traynor, Jean-Claude Juncker Confirmed as European Commission President, GUARDIAN (Jul.
15, 2014, 8:51 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/15/jean-claude-junckereuropean-commission-president1.
111 Nicholas Watt & Ian Traynor, Juncker is Wrong Person for European Commission Job, Says David
Cameron, GUARDIAN (Jun. 27, 2014, 4:41
AM),https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/27/juncker-wrong-person-europeancommission-leadership-david-cameron.
112 Id.
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3. Physical Locations of IOs
Another important choice facing states when designing IOs is the
location of headquarters. Several governments typically lobby to locate IOs
within their home territories, ideally in their capital cities, to ensure the IO
most closely aligns with their national interests. However, other
governments fear such an arrangement, since it would enable the host
country to exercise undue influence over the IO. Consequently, IOs are
rarely located in the capital city of its most powerful member. Rather, more
remote countries and cities are often chosen because of their expected
neutrality. While such a choice may resolve the horizontal distributional
conflict at the IO’s founding, we argue that it worsens the vertical agency
conflict down the line. When IO secretariats are far from key national
capitals, they increasingly experience a different daily reality than that of
national leaders, and receive less frequent and pressing lobbying from
leaders and lobbyists in the national capital. This separation begets the
development of an IO-specific subculture. This is especially likely for IOs
located in relatively small and remote cities, where international staff
constitute a substantial minority and live in a separate bubble, interacting
primarily with one another.113 This argument depends critically on the
assumption that IO staff are socialized differently because they interact
heavily with other IO staff; this argument should work less well when
socialization processes take a different form.
Some examples help illustrate these dynamics. Let us start with perhaps
the most integrated international organization today—the European Union.
First established in 1952 as the European Coal and Steel Community
(ECSC), it consisted of three large member states—Germany, France, and
Italy—and three very small ones—the Netherlands, Belgium, and
Luxembourg.114 Each jostled for influence, seeking to place the
headquarters in its territory, ideally in its capital. German and Italian cities,
however, were never serious contenders, in part because the legacy of World
War II was still vivid.115 More interestingly, Paris turned out to be equally
objectionable, precisely because it was the national capital of a powerful
state.116 Luxembourg was chosen as the best location for the ECSC
secretariat precisely “because it had nothing of ‘real capital’ about it.”117 At
the same time, the European Parliament was placed in Strasbourg “because
113 See About UN Environment: Contact Us, UNITED NATIONS ENV’T PROGRAMME,
http://web.unep.org/about/who-we-are/contact-us (last visited Dec. 2, 2017) (listing its location as
Nairobi, Kenya).
114 Carola Hein, Choosing a Site for the Capital of Europe, 51 GEOJOURNAL 83, 86 (2000).
115 DIRK SPIERENBURG & RAYMOND POIDEVIN, THE HISTORY OF THE H IGH AUTHORITY
OF THE EUROPEAN COAL AND STEEL COMMUNITY: SUPRANATIONALITY IN OPERATION 34
(1994); Hein, supra note 114, at 87.
116 Hein, supra note 114, at 87.
117 Id. at 89.
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it was the only city that could house the European Parliament in a nonnational building, that of the Council of Europe.”118 Finally, six years later,
Brussels—another relatively small capital—was picked to house the
European Economic Community (EEC) and Euratom.119 The European
Court of Justice was placed in Luxembourg for the same set of reasons.120
Today, the European Parliament primarily operates from Brussels, but
because of France’s resistance, the Parliament must decamp from Brussels
to its original home, Strasbourg, for a week every month.121 The fact that
several thousand politicians and staff, together with truckloads carrying
some 2,500 plastic trunks, make the 300-mile journey from Brussels to
Strasbourg every month—at a great expense to European taxpayers—
reflects the salience of the conflict over the geographic location of IOs.122
Placing IO headquarters at a distance from powerful foreign states’
capitals may seem like a good way to solve the distributional conflict among
states and ensure that a foreign state does not get undue influence over the
IO. We argue, however, that this may worsen states’ ability collectively to
control a wayward IO bureaucracy. Namely, it may allow IO staff to live in
their own separate bubble, far from the pressures facing elected leaders in
national capitals. This is precisely what many believe has happened in the
modern de facto EU capital—Brussels.
About 100,000 EU expats live in Brussels, constituting over 10% of the
city’s population.123 EU expats often “live among themselves” in “luxury
ghettos” around the European district.124 Recent surveys confirm that
expats interact mostly with other expats—rather than with Belgians—send
their children to international schools, and rarely participate in local
elections.125 Under these conditions, it is no wonder that EU staff develop
a strong EU identity, as illustrated in repeated surveys.126
Id.
Id.
120 Id. at 90–91.
121 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Protocol
6(a), Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326/265); see also Visit the European Parliament, EUR. PARLIAMENT,
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/visiting/en/ (last visited Dec. 2, 2017).
122 See Robert Mendick, The Farce of the EU Travelling Circus, TELEGRAPH (Jan. 11, 2014),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/10565686/The-farce-of-the-EU-travellingcircus.html.
123 Frédéric Simon, EU Expat Survey Hammers Home “Brussels Bubble” Clichés, EURACTIV (July 9,
2013), http://www.euractiv.com/section/languages-culture/news/eu-expat-survey-hammers-homebrussels-bubble-cliches/.
124 Id.
125 Id.; see also EUROPE.BRUSSELS LIAISON OFFICE, SURVEY ABOUT THE LIFE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY
IN
BRUSSELS
24
(2013),
http://aerwww.ameos.net/fileadmin/user_upload/PressComm/Publications/AERNewsletter/2013/Newslett
er_Septembre/Europe-Brussels-Brochure-Enquete-EN-03.pdf; Brussels Expats Seen as “Separate
Community”: Study, EURACTIV (Aug. 31, 2009), http://www.euractiv.com/pa/brussels-expats-seenseparate-co-news-222468.
126 Hooghe, supra note 101.
118
119
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Figure 1127
Figure 1 above suggests that while Brussels is by far the city with the
most IO headquarters, relatively small and distant European cities, such as
Geneva and Vienna, also attract many IOs. This figure is perhaps most
striking because Washington and Moscow, capitals of the two most
powerful states for much of the post-WWII period, are not in the top ten
cities of IO headquarters. This illustrates that neutral locations, far from
enemy capitals, are often preferred by negotiating states prioritizing the
horizontal conflict. This logic is not unique to IOs—after all, U.S. states
forming a federal system chose Washington, D.C. as the location of the new
federal state, precisely because it constituted a rural backwater.128
That said, while Figure 1 suggests that most IOs are located in relatively
remote cities, some IOs are in powerful national capitals. Prominent among
them are the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, both
headquartered in Washington, D.C. This decision was made in March 1946,
when delegates from thirty-five countries met in Savannah, Georgia.129
While most expected the headquarters to be in the U.S., delegates from the
U.K. and many other countries argued for the headquarters to be removed
from direct D.C. influence to New York City, along with the UN

5 Union of Int’l Ass’ns, Y.B. of Int’s Orgs, 143–44 (2015).
Andrew Glass, Washington Signs Residence Act July 16, 1790, POLITICO (Jul. 16, 2008, 4:18
AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2008/07/washington-signs-residence-act-july-16-1790011772.
129 See Kevin M. Casey, SAVING INTERNATIONAL CAPITALISM DURING THE EARLY TRUMAN
PRESIDENCY: THE NATIONAL A DVISORY COUNCIL ON INTERNATIONAL MONETARY AND
FINANCIAL PROBLEMS 186 (2001).
127
128
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headquarters and the big banks.130 However, as John Maynard Keynes
highlighted, U.S. Treasury Secretary Fred Vinson, head of the U.S.
delegation, “had no great difficulty in railroading” the decision to seat these
bodies in Washington through the conference.131 In addition, historiography
on the founding of the World Bank and IMF suggests that a different type
of isolation was envisioned. U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau
argued that new institutions such as the World Bank and IMF should be
“instrumentalities of sovereign governments and not of private financial
interests.”132 This meant that the headquarters of private finance, New York
and London, should be avoided.133
Another example of where to situate an international body comes from
the most prominent modern IO—the United Nations. While Geneva,
Switzerland was an early proposed location for the UN,134 delegates from
many countries quickly decided the UN would have its seat in the United
States, both to reflect the new post-WWII realities, and to distance the body
from its discredited predecessor, the League of Nations.135 But the question
then became: where in the United States? Over forty cities were on an initial
list to host the UN, including San Francisco, New York, Boston, Baltimore,
Chicago, Philadelphia, and New Orleans.136 What was notably missing from
this list is the U.S. capital—Washington, D.C.137 Indeed, in December 1945,
the UN Committee considering the headquarters question also eliminated
Philadelphia from an early list, lest it was too close to Washington, enabling
the U.S. government to exert undue influence on the UN.138 Ultimately, a
year later, a dramatic, unexpected, and generous offer from John D.
Rockefeller to buy a six-block area along the East River and donate it to the
UN resolved the controversy in favor of New York City.139 What is
important to recall here is that at the peak of U.S. power and legitimacy—
the end of World War II—governments lobbied for the UN headquarters
not to be built in Washington, D.C., and succeeded.
130 Id.; see also The World Bank in Washington's Foggy Bottom?, THE WORLD BANK,
http://www.worldbank.org/en/about/archives/history/exhibits/the-world-bank-in-washingtonsfoggy-bottom (last visited Dec. 2, 2017); Arvind Subramanian, The IMF: Keynes' Non-Candidate, BUS.
STANDARD INDIA (May 25, 2011), http://www.business-standard.com/article/opinion/arvindsubramanian-the-imf-keynes-non-candidate-111052500029_1.html.
131 Casey, supra note 129.
132 ODETTE LIENAU, RETHINKING SOVEREIGN DEBT: POLITICS, R EPUTATION, AND
LEGITIMACY IN MODERN FINANCE 125 (2014).
133 Id.
134 Linda S. Phipps, “Constructing” the United Nations Headquarters: Modern Architecture as
Public Diplomacy 1-2, Chapters 1-2 (1998) (Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University) (on file with
author).
135 See Elton Atwater, Philadelphia's Quest to Become the Permanent Headquarters of the United Nations,
100 PA. MAG. HIST. & B IOGRAPHY 243, 246 (1976).
136 Id.
137 Id. at 247.
138 Id.
139 Id. at 254–56.
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4. Broad IO Mandates and Mission Creep
The scope of an IO’s mandate is one of the critical decisions states must
make when setting up an IO. When states’ interests diverge, the easiest way
to resolve the disagreement is by broadening the bargaining zone within
which a compromise could be identified. Adding new items to the
bargaining table, for example, often ensures the diverging interests of
various states can be satisfied. When the agenda is broad enough, every state
can find something to justify their participation in the IO. The IO mandate
can also be left ambiguous so that each state can interpret it in a manner
consistent with its interests. Vesting the IO with a broad or flexible mandate
is therefore often an effective response to a horizontal conflict. However,
vertical conflict looms large every time the IO mission is broadly or loosely
defined. Such a structure invites opportunistic behavior by an IO’s
bureaucracy, and often leads to mission creep, where an IO strays beyond
its initial mandate. This is because a broadly defined mandate expands the
agent’s powers and makes it harder to monitor the agent’s performance
effectively. Moreover, a loosely defined mandate creates a problem of
incomplete contracting, where the agent’s mandate is only partially specified
ex ante, heightening the need for enhanced monitoring ex post. Both broad
and loose mandates therefore make it easier for the agent to deviate from
its mission and behave opportunistically.
Mission creep is largely recognized as a phenomenon that undermines
international cooperation.140 Critics have focused on the problem of
legitimacy, as well as the disparity between broad IO mandates and IO
resources. These features, critics assert, undermine the IO’s ability to carry
out even its basic functions effectively. Our criticism is different. We focus
on mission creep as a manifestation of a joint problem, portraying the
phenomenon as a vertical conflict that is the direct consequence of the
states’ conscious attempt to overcome their horizontal conflicts in the first
place.
The EU offers perhaps the most striking example of broad IO missions
and the ensuing mission creep.141 The EU started off as an institution
narrowly focused on integrating Western European steel and coal industries.
It soon moved to establish a customs union and remove internal trade
barriers. Since then, the competences of the EU have grown to embrace
issues ranging from environmental and consumer protection to social
140 See, e.g., MICHAEL BARNETT & MARTHA F INNEMORE, RULES FOR THE
WORLD: INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN GLOBAL POLITICS 2 (2004); Sungjoon Cho, An
International Organization’s Identity Crisis, 34 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 359, 380–81 (2014); Daniel D.
Bradlow, Should the International Financial Institutions Play a Role in the Implementation and Enforcement of
International Humanitarian Law?, 50 U. KAN. L. REV. 695, 707 (2002); Jessica Einhorn, The World Bank’s
Mission Creep, 80(5) FOREIGN AFF. 22 (Sept.–Oct. 2001).
141 LORNA WOODS & P HILIPPA WATSON, STEINER & WOODS EU LAW 51 (12th ed. 2014).
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policy, transport, public health, privacy, and criminal justice. When the EU
started to pursue more extensive economic liberalization, it tried to obtain
the cooperation of skeptical member states by balancing its liberal economic
agenda with extensive social protections. The point of this balancing act was
to offset any adverse effects of rapid economic integration with adequate
social protections.142 Therefore, the broad mandate the EU has today
originated from EU member states’ disagreements on how to balance
various domestic consumer or environmental protection measures with the
need to guarantee unrestricted trade within the common market. The easiest
way to resolve this horizontal conflict was not to make a choice between an
economic and social Europe—inevitably alienating some member states—
but to expand the EU’s competences to cover both.143 This movement
toward “an ever-closer union”—an expansion of the EU’s mandate well
beyond what the U.K. ever intended—was at the heart of the U.K.’s
discontent with the EU, driving the EU membership referendum, and thus
leading the U.K. to now abandon the EU altogether.144
The WTO exhibits a similar evolution, where its trade agenda was
extended to cover IP back in 1995, with the conclusion of the TRIPS
agreement.145 The expansion to IP would never have occurred in isolation.
Instead, it was introduced as part of a “single undertaking” deal across a
range of policy areas, which was designed to deliver some gains for all
member states.146 In the case of TRIPS, it was evident that developed
countries, where the majority of research and development takes place, were
the beneficiaries of enhanced IP protections, and that developing countries,
where IP-protected products are mainly consumed or copied, were the
losers under the agreement.147 Thus, the main challenge in the TRIPS
negotiations was to overcome this distributional conflict and win the
support of developing countries. Developing countries were eventually
brought into the agreement by linking the TRIPS negotiations to

142

See Ian Bain & François Netoux, Social Protection and Economic Union, 5 J. EUR. SOC. POL’Y 285

(1995).
143 Case C-438/05, Int’l Transp. Workers’ Fed’n v. Viking Line ABP, 2007 E.C.R. I-10779. See
Darren G. Hawkins, David A. Lake, Daniel L. Nielson & Michael J. Tierney, Delegation Under Anarchy:
States, International Organizations, and Principal-Agent Theory, in DELEGATION AND AGENCY IN
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 3, 3–38 (Darren G. Hawkins, David A. Lake, Daniel L. Nielson
& Michael J. Tierney eds., 2006).
144 Palmeri, supra note 1.
145 See generally Anu Bradford, When the WTO Works, and How It Fails, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 1 (2010).
146 Richard H. Steinberg, In the Shadow of Law or Power? Consensus-Based Bargaining and Outcomes in
the GATT/WTO, 56 INT’L ORG. 360 (2002).
147 See A. O. Adede, The Political Economy of the TRIPs Agreement: Origins and History of
Negotiations 4 (July 30, 2001) (unpublished manuscript, presented at the Eastern and Southern Africa
Multi-Stakeholder Dialogue on Trade, Intellectual Property and Biological Resources, Nairobi, Kenya).
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concessions in other areas, including agriculture and textiles.148 This
strategic linkage of unrelated issues contributed to unlocking the horizontal
conflict and paving the way for a compromise. At the same time, however,
it empowered the WTO as a multi-issue IO, spurring the call for further
expansion of the WTO’s mission to include a wide range of trade-related
issues, including investment, competition, environment, and labor rights.
The World Bank’s mandate has similarly expanded over time. The Bank
was created after World War II to provide loans to foster economic
development, in particular to fund public infrastructure projects.149 In the
ensuing decades, the Bank adopted a considerably broader view of
development, seeking to stimulate development via programs as diverse as
the promotion of literacy, entrepreneurship, labor regulations, gender
equality, and environmental sustainability.150 While supporters may
commend the Bank’s accomplishments, critics are quick to condemn its
foray into more controversial domestic policy areas, and characterize its use
of conditional lending as oppressive.151 Jessica Einhorn, the former
Managing Director of the Bank, has described how the Bank took on a large
number of new issues over time that strayed beyond the IO’s core mission.
She notes how “the bank takes on challenges that lie far beyond any
institution’s operational capabilities,” and that “its mission has become so
complex that it strains credulity to portray the bank as a manageable
organization.”152 The Bank’s new “unachievable mission” is not surprising,
given the Bank faces pressure from many different constituencies. She also
acknowledges the difficulty of reining back the new agendas because every
new program has created its own constituency that resists change.153
These examples illustrate a dynamic where vertical conflict stems from
the states’ deliberate decision to include new issues on the negotiating
agenda as a way to secure a buy-in of some initially skeptical states. A
broader mandate may successfully alleviate a horizontal conflict by ensuring
the IO is vested with the competence to advance something that every key
stakeholder benefits from. Expanded IO missions can also be desirable
because they reflect the desire of states to pursue scope economies, where
various policy issues are closely related and efficiently addressed in
conjunction with one another. Many supporters of the EU and the WTO,
for instance, would say these institutions have become successful precisely
148 Within the IP domain, few additional concessions were also given to the developing countries,
including promises of technology transfer and transition periods that allow them to delay
implementation of the TRIPs Agreement.
149 Einhorn, supra note 140, at 23.
150 Id. at 23–24.
151 Id. at 27–29; A SEED EUR., WORLD BANK CONDITIONALITIES: POOR DEAL FOR POOR
COUNTRIES 33 (2008),
http://www.aseed.net/pdfs/ASEED_Report_on_Worldbank_Conditionalities.pdf.
152 Einhorn, supra note 140.
153 Id.
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because of their ability to form linkages and resolve policy conflicts that
span across multiple issue areas.154 Too narrow IOs with overly constrained
mandates would not be able to accomplish the same.
At the same time, vesting the IO with a broad mandate sets the stage
for a vertical conflict. It facilitates agency slack because an agent with a
flexible and expansive mission is harder to monitor, and almost impossible
to rein in as the multiple agendas become entrenched. Principal-agent theory
suggests that an effective way to constrain an agent is to empower it with a
clear mission and a tightly constrained mandate to carry out that mission.155
Therefore, if states and principals were initially concerned about a wayward
agent, they would delegate only a narrow set of goals for the IO to
accomplish. A clearly defined set of narrow goals makes it difficult for the
agent to deviate from its task, and easier for the principals to monitor the
agent’s performance.156 However, if the IO’s mandate is set with the
horizontal conflict in mind, states end up with IOs that govern multiple
issues with broad and hard-to-control mandates, inadvertently exacerbating
the vertical conflict, just as the theory of joint problem would predict.
In this Part, we have identified several ways in which solutions to the
horizontal conflict end up worsening the vertical conflict. We have shown
how super-majority rules designed to protect the interests of individual
states make it difficult to reverse decisions by an independent bureaucracy
or tribunal. In addition, the tendency for each country to place its nationals
in key IO positions can result in a multi-national bureaucracy, more
supportive of further international cooperation than any individual national
priority. Similarly, locating an IO in a remote city reinforces the
internationalist orientation of the IO staff, and further removes them from
concerns in national capitals. Finally, linking multiple issues to bring diverse
states to the negotiating table often results in IOs with broad mandates, and
their staff become difficult to discipline as a result. While both the vertical
and the horizontal conflict have been extensively studied in earlier work,
these connections between the two problems have not been previously
examined in international law and international relations. To identify some
possible ways to resolve these conflicts, we now turn to a literature that has
studied these intersections—corporate law literature.
154 See, e.g., Bradford, supra note 145; Christina L. Davis, International Institutions and Issue Linkage:
Building Support for Agricultural Trade Liberalization, 98 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 153, 163–65 (2004); James
K. Sebenius, Negotiation Arithmetic: Adding and Subtracting Issues and Parties, 37 INT 'L ORG. 281, 300
(1983) (noting “cases in which adding issues may be mutually beneficial” to negotiating parties);
Robert D. Tollison & Thomas D. Willett, An Economic Theory of Mutually Advantageous Issue Linkages in
International Negotiations, 33 INT 'L ORG. 425, 430–37 (1979) (discussing an economic model of issue
linkages).
155 CARMEN E. PAVEL, DIVIDED SOVEREIGNTY: INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND THE
LIMITS OF STATE AUTHORITY 45 (2014).
156 Id.
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IV. RESOLVING THE JOINT PROBLEM IN OTHER CONTEXTS: IDEAS
FROM CORPORATE LAW
We argue above that, in an effort to preempt future conflict, states
introduce governance measures that end up tying their own hands, thus
boosting the decision-making leeway of international bodies. The trade-off
between balanced state influence horizontally, and empowered IO executive
bodies vertically, has gone largely unnoticed in the literature on international
law and international relations, which treats these two dimensions as
distinct. To be sure, leading rational choice theorists recognize that an
international organization is an agent of its members.157 However, they
prefer the analytic simplicity of merging all states into a single collective
principal, rather than the complicated reality of treating each state as a
separate principal with distinct preferences and ideal points.158
Constructivist scholars highlight that international bureaucracies, like all
bureaucracies, take on a distinct identity and may not pursue their goals
efficiently.159 But constructivist scholars have not yet explored how specific
balanced governance solutions, which are widespread among IOs,
eventually worsen the pathologies of international bureaucracies. Nor do
constructivists argue, as we do, that these rules have origins in the horizontal
conflicts among states. Unsurprisingly, there have been no serious efforts to
address the challenges raised by the interaction between horizontal and
vertical conflicts, either in theoretical literature or on the policy ground.
In contrast, the dilemmas facing multiple principals, who must choose
between a powerful and potentially self-serving co-principal on the one
hand, and an insulated and thus hard-to-control agent on the other, are
central to corporate law literature. A key goal of corporate law is to pull
together contributions from multiple investors, thereby gathering the
resources necessary for the intended business venture.160 In this sense,
investors are not unlike states that combine efforts to accomplish a mission
through an IO. And just like states, investors also need reassurance that
corporate resources will not be diverted to pernicious uses. A particular
worry for minority shareholders is that a majority shareholder can easily take
control and run the firm according to her preferences, looting (shared)
corporate assets in the process.161 Faced with this horizontal conflict, and
seeking to protect minority shareholders in particular, corporate law
Lyne, Nielson & Tierney, supra note 69, at 42.
Id.; but see Copelovitch, supra note 27.
159 See, e.g., Michael N. Barnett & Martha Finnemore, The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International
Organizations, 53 INT’L ORG. 699 (1999).
160 See, e.g., John Armour, Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, What Is Corporate Law?, in THE
ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW 1 (Reinier Kraakman et al. eds., 2d ed. 2009) (describing corporations
as the legal entity chosen for large-scale business enterprises with multiple investors).
161 See ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 141–45 (1986).
157
158
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insulates the board of directors from the majority and requires it to act for
the benefit of all shareholders.162 For example, various corporate law
provisions create hurdles for powerful shareholders seeking to fill the board
with their representatives. But as many corporate law scholars have
recognized, empowering the board may lead to managerial abuses.163
Starting from these realizations, corporate lawyers have engaged in a
decades-long debate about the optimal level of board independence and
shareholder control, and explored mechanisms to ameliorate particularly
challenging situations.164 The shareholder democracy camp points to
managers’ self-aggrandizing tendencies,165 while the pro-management group
argues that shareholders cannot fully understand the stakes, and may have
conflicting interests.166 More recently, Goshen and Squire have underlined
that the division of control between shareholders and managers is a zerosum proposition.167 They note that as shareholders claim ever-greater
control of the company, they reduce a board’s flexibility to exercise its
business judgment, which can make the firm worse off if the shareholders
lack the skills to effectively manage the company.168 By analogizing IO
member states to shareholders and IO organs to corporate boards, we can
tap into the extensive literature in corporate law that studies both the
conflict among shareholders, and the conflict between shareholders and
managers.169
The corporate law literature provides three important insights for the
study of IO delegation. First, when shareholders face greater coordination
problems, corporate law delegates decision-making power to the board as a
way of protecting small, passive shareholders from large, active ones.170
162 For example, corporate law often casts directors as trustees for shareholders. See Deborah A.
DeMott, Guests at the Table: Independent Directors in Family-Influenced Public Companies, 33(4) J. CORP. L. 819
(2008). Jeffrey Gordon also remarks that independent directors can better serve a vision of shareholder
value maximization tied to stock performance, rather than the goals of insiders. See Jeffrey N. Gordon,
The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 1950-2005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices,
59 STAN. L. REV. 1465 (2007).
163 See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Pay Without Performance: Overview of the Issues, 30 J.
CORP. L. 647 (2005).
164 For an overview of this literature, with a special emphasis on corporate takeovers, see Steven
M. Davidoff, Takeover Theory and the Law and Economics Movement, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE
ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE LAW (Claire A. Hill and Brett H. McDonell eds., 2012).
165 See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competition
in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1435, 1440–41 (1992).
166 See Martin Lipton & Paul K. Rowe, Pills, Polls, and Professors: A Reply to Professor Gilson, 27 DEL.
J. CORP. L. 1, 42–46 (2002).
167 Zohar Goshen & Richard Squire, Principal Costs (2015) (Columbia Law Sch. Pub. Law Research
Paper, Paper No. 14-462).
168 Id. at 12–13.
169 See generally John Armour, Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Agency Problems and Legal
Strategies, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH
35 (Reinier Kraakman ed., 2d ed. 2009).
170 Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE
LAW 66–67 (1991). Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout view corporate law more generally as a set of rules
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Because corporations exist in perpetuity, shareholders cannot accurately
predict or dictate actions necessary for the long-term success of the
business. As such, the board becomes an attentive, well-informed agent
tasked with looking after the interests of shareholders. In firms with a
dispersed shareholder base, the board’s key task is to monitor the firm’s top
management. But when a populous group of minority shareholders finds
itself coupled with a controlling shareholder, the board undertakes the
additional role of protecting the minority from the whims of the controlling
shareholder. To do so effectively, the board often receives extensive powers
to oppose the will of the majority shareholder.171 Yet, this leads to the
second key insight from corporate law: broad powers granted to protect
minority shareholders can result in entrenching the board. Predictably,
boards may abuse their powers in order to protect either their own interests
or the interests of top management. To ensure that, when exercising
discretion, boards remain focused on promoting the interests of
shareholders rather than engaging in self-serving behavior, corporate boards
are subject to fiduciary duties. This broad grant of powers constrained by
fiduciary duties has many parallels in the delegation of authority by
sovereign states to international organizations, as has been recognized.172
Third and finally, corporate law provides a series of suggestions about how
to ameliorate the joint problem. To preempt harm to minority shareholders,
corporate law delineates situations where the board is particularly likely to
face conflicts of interest, and recommends special decision-making
procedures with higher independence safeguards.173 Moreover, corporate
law mandates greater transparency and disclosure to shareholders as a way
of empowering minorities seeking to discipline the board. Below, we
examine these three insights in turn.
Some words of caution are necessary before proceeding. We do not
mean to suggest that IO organs and corporate boards are similar in all ways.
To start, most corporate boards are free to pursue whatever business goals
they choose, while IO organs are limited by their treaty mandates. Corporate
boards’ almost unbridled flexibility suggests that, in certain circumstances,
the vertical conflict might be more intense. On the other hand, corporate
boards are single-handedly oriented toward profit-making, while IO organs
serve a broader set of often public-minded goals. Profit maximization
created to facilitate a group of stakeholders to relinquish powers to manage assets to a board, given the
inherent inability to run a long-term contract. See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production
Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 248 (1999).
171 For example, Delaware law provides a board with the power to oppose a bidder seeking to
acquire the company by triggering a poison pill, issuing numerous new shares that will dilute the
bidder’s initial position. Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
172 See Giandomenico Majone, Two Logics of Delegation: Agency and Fiduciary Relations in EU
Governance, 2 EUR. UNION POL. 103, 117–118 (2001).
173 See infra Part III.C.
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provides a clear yardstick for assessing board performance, while evaluating
IOs’ actions is not as straightforward. Moreover, some corporations are
owned by a single shareholder, and yet boards still have a significant role to
play in supervising the day-to-day running of the corporation. Boards often
consist of experienced businessmen with superior information about the
company’s business, and may have better resources to monitor corporate
activity.174 Yet, despite these differences, corporate law envisages boards as
especially useful when multiple shareholders come together, providing a
governance structure that brings together individuals with different goals
and time horizons.175 In this respect, corporate boards and IO organs are
quite similar. This is where our thought experiment begins.

A. Greater Shareholder Coordination Costs Increase Delegation of Powers to
Boards
Delegation of decision-making powers to the board of directors, a key
feature of corporate law, prevents shareholders from directly proposing and
implementing business choices.176 Since the nineteenth century, courts have
ruled that boards should not submit to the will of a shareholder, even if the
shareholder controls the majority of the company’s share capital.177 Rather,
boards should act as representatives of all shareholders, thinking of the
aggregate interests of the corporation rather than the desires of the majority.
Thus, corporate law seeks to neutralize the outsized influence of a majority
shareholder when the shareholder’s preferred course would harm the
interests of the corporation, namely the interests of the other shareholders.
Due to board autonomy, shareholders seeking to shape the
corporation’s business must find indirect ways of influencing the board.
Generally, corporate law provides shareholders with two channels of input:
the process of electing and removing board members,178 and through special
rights to approve fundamental transactions, such as mergers179 or charter
amendments.180 However, the extent to which these channels are open to
shareholders depends largely on the underlying ownership patterns of the
174 Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy in Corporate Takeovers: Preliminary Reflections, 55 STAN. L.
REV. 791 (2002).
175 Id.
176 Luca Enriques, Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Basic Governance Structure: The
Interests of Shareholders as a Class, in THE A NATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND
FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 55, 72–75 (Reinier Kraakman ed., 2d ed. 2009).
177 See, e.g., Automatic Self-Cleansing Filter Syndicate Co. Ltd. v. Cuninghame [1906] 2 Ch 34
(Eng.).
178 Delaware law requires a shareholder vote for electing directors, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211
(2011), and allows a shareholder majority to remove directors without cause; but cause is required if
the board is staggered, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(k) (2011).
179 DEL. CODE A NN. tit. 8, § 251(c) (2011).
180 DEL. CODE A NN. tit. 8, § 242(b)(1) (2011 & Supp. 2016).
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corporation, and the resulting costs of coordination. While adhering to the
principle of majority voting, corporate law also introduces mechanisms
intended to constrain powerful shareholders from steering the corporation
in their preferred direction, as the discussion below illustrates. These
mechanisms are typically justified as measures to protect the inherent value
of the corporation for all shareholders, minority shareholders especially.
Rules for the election and appointment of corporate directors prevent
powerful shareholders from dominating the board, particularly if they fall
short of a shareholder majority. To start, the board itself nominates
candidates for board positions through its proxy materials.181 A shareholder
block, typically 1–3%, can use the company’s proxy to nominate candidates,
if allowed by the charter, but they still have to run against the boards’
nominees.182 In many cases, significant shareholders are content with
electing one representative, stopping far short of control. Shareholders may
be better able to influence board members if they can not only appoint them,
but also threaten to remove them before their tenure expires. In most
jurisdictions, including Delaware, only a majority of shareholders has the
right to remove directors at will.183 But even then, Delaware allows for an
important exception from at-will removal of directors by permitting a
staggered board. When a board is staggered, with different classes of
directors having their tenure expire at different intervals, a shareholder
majority can remove directors only for cause.184 This substantial inroad into
shareholder powers is typically justified as a mechanism to promote
investment in projects that can produce superior long-term results.
However, in the short run, inability to discipline the board can drag the stock
price down.185 In practice, a staggered board can delay even a majority
shareholder from taking full control of the corporation for several years.
Takeovers represent a particularly precarious moment for shareholders,
and can be fraught with horizontal conflicts.186 Bidders typically propose a

DEL. CODE A NN. tit. 8, § 212(c) (2011).
A federal rule to that effect was adopted by the SEC and then struck down, but some
corporations amend their charters to achieve the same result. See generally Lucian A. Bebchuk & Scott
Hirst, Private Ordering and the Proxy Access Debate, 65 BUS. L. 329 (2010) (arguing that this should be a
default rule, rather than an opt-in rule in corporate law).
183 Enriques, Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 176, at 64–66. In some jurisdictions, there are
exceptions for board members appointed to represent specific constituencies, such as labor
representatives in Germany.
184 DEL. CODE A NN. tit. 8, § 141(k) (2011).
185 See generally Stephen P. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment, 119 HARV.
L. REV. 1735 (2006); William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder
Empowerment, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 653 (2010).
186 For an overview of takeover deal making, see generally STEVEN M. DAVIDOFF, GODS AT
WAR: SHOTGUN TAKEOVERS, GOVERNMENT BY DEAL, AND THE PRIVATE EQUITY IMPLOSION
(2010) (exploring how legal intricacies affect takeover strategies on the ground).
181
182
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premium over market price in return for gaining control of the company.187
Sometimes, bidders already have significant amounts of the company’s
stock, and may even own a majority. Or, some shareholders may be
motivated to sell, while others may prefer to wait until the company’s
strategy bears fruit. In any event, corporate law requires boards to step in
and assess the offer.188 If a board decides the offer is inadequate, it has broad
powers to avert a takeover bid, even if a shareholder majority wishes
otherwise.189 Delaware takeover jurisprudence allows the board to utilize
corporate assets to promise alternative pay-outs to shareholders, so as to
fend off takeover attempts.190 Boards can also utilize poison pills, which
involve issuing stock or some other assembly of corporate assets to all
shareholders except the acquirer, which dilutes the acquirer’s existing equity
stake in the target and forces it to speak directly to the board.191 With such
extensive delegated powers, Delaware law envisions the board as a wellinformed decision-maker devised to intervene and protect minorities against
a shareholder majority that finds itself in the wrong.

B. Broad Powers Granted to Protect Shareholders Can Entrench the Board
In the conventional account of corporate law, as discussed above, the
vertical delegation of powers to the corporate board addresses concerns
about potential horizontal conflicts among shareholders. Not only does a
powerful board represent a nimble management structure, but it also
ensures shareholders, especially minorities, that their investments will not
fall prey to incompetent managers or whimsical majorities.192 Yet, as
corporate law scholars have emphasized, neutralizing the influence of
powerful shareholders on the board comes at the cost of blunting the
traditional mechanisms of disciplining the board.193 A board insulated from
pressures to yield to shareholders can also develop and pursue its own
agenda, regardless of whether that agenda is consistent with shareholder
aspirations.194 As a result, the board can either shirk its fundamental duties
to shareholders, or appropriate for itself benefits belonging to shareholders.
Thus, the very mechanisms designed to check shareholders’ power vis-à-vis
other shareholders have the inadvertent effect of permitting a board to
abuse its powers.
187 See, e.g., Lynn A. Stout, Are Takeover Premiums Really Premiums? Market Price, Fair Value, and
Corporate Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1235, 1235 (1990).
188 See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
189 See, e.g., Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
190 Id.
191 See, e.g., Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
192 See Oliver E. Williamson, Corporate Governance, 93 YALE L.J. 1197, 1210 (1984).
193 See Donald C. Langevoort, The Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Law, Norms, and the Unintended
Consequences of Independence and Accountability, 89 GEO. L.J. 797, 814–15 (2001).
194 See Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833 (2005).
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An extensive literature in corporate law focuses on the vertical conflict
between shareholders and managers.195 It argues that entrenched boards are
prone to managerial abuses and likely to choose strategies that serve their
own interests instead of those of shareholders. Boards, for example, may
approve expensive acquisitions to expand their influence,196 they may pay
themselves and their managers more, even when it is not justified by
corporate performance,197 or they may retain excessive funds in the
corporation, rather than distribute dividends to shareholders.198 Prominent
corporate law scholars sensitive to these abuses argue for increasing
shareholder power over boards. They find support in many leading
economists, who claim companies with more accountable governance
structures tend to perform better in the long term.199 They also found that
governance arrangements that entrench boards, such as staggering, were
associated with lower valuations.200 This camp has made headway in recent
years through shareholder activists, typically hedge funds run by famous
investors like Carl Icahn and Bill Ackman,201 who typically demand reforms
that increase shareholder influence, such as de-staggering boards.202
Regardless of whether one supports or opposes board entrenchment,
one thing is clear: both groups see the interplay between horizontal and
vertical conflict as a trade-off. When concerns arise over a powerful
shareholder abusing its influence over a corporation, broadening the
delegation of decision-making powers to a third body seems a plausible
solution. Yet, the more independent this third party becomes, the more
likely it will be to advance its own goals over those of its principals. Aware
of this trade-off, more corporations choose a different mix of board powers
and shareholder influence mechanisms. Some provide the board with
195 The seminal contribution that began this conversation conceptualized the board as an agent
of the shareholders, and explored the associated agency costs. See Michael C. Jensen & William H.
Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305
(1976).
196 WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, BUSINESS BEHAVIOR, VALUE, AND GROWTH (1967); Yakov Amihud
& Baruch Lev, Risk Reduction as a Managerial Motive for Conglomerate Mergers, 12 BELL J. ECON. 605 (1981);
Dennis C. Mueller, A Theory of Conglomerate Mergers, 83 Q.J. ECON. 643 (1969).
197 See generally LUCIAN A. BEBCHUK & JESSE M. FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE
UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2004) (arguing that managers have been
able to increase their pay without justification because corporate law does not facilitate effective
shareholder supervision).
198 Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Management Entrenchment: The Case of Manager-Specific
Investments, 25 J. FIN. ECON. 123 (1989).
199 See generally Paul A. Gompers, Joy L. Ishii & Andrew Metrick, Corporate Governance and Equity
Prices, 118 Q.J. ECON. 107 (2003).
200 Lucian A. Bebchuk, John C. Coates, IV & Guhan Subramanian, The Powerful Antitakeover Force
of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 887 (2002); but see Martjin Cremers &
Simone M. Sepe, The Shareholder Value of Empowered Boards, 68 STAN. L. REV. 837 (2016).
201 See Brian R. Cheffins & John Armour, The Past, Present, and Future of Shareholder Activism by Hedge
Funds, 37 J. CORP. L. 51 (2011).
202 See, e.g., Carl Icahn, Corporate Boards That Do Their Job, WASH. POST (Feb. 16, 2009),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/02/15/AR2009021501256.html.
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significant leeway, so talented management can pursue its strategies
unencumbered, like Apple in the Steve Jobs era.203 Others adopt devices to
ensure control stays with powerful shareholders, such as the dual class
structure of Google and the New York Times.204 As Goshen and Squire
argue, there is a continuum between complete shareholder control and
absolute management discretion,205 and corporations make different choices
based on their industry, their needs, and human talent available to them.

C. Lessons for International Law: Ways to Ameliorate the Unintended
Consequences of Horizontal and Vertical Interaction
The debate over the intersection of horizontal and vertical conflicts in
corporations persists in law reviews, courtrooms, and legislative chambers.
While generally upholding the governance choices reflected in corporate
charters, courts have intervened when they see an especially grave clash
between horizontal and vertical interests.206 For these instances, courts have
promulgated doctrines to help protect minority shareholders, who otherwise
risk being outflanked by majorities or managers. Legislatures have also
established special rules for corporations with publicly traded stock, which
protect retail investors who are too small and numerous to actively engage
in management. These corporate law remedies, we believe, offer guidance
on how to address similar clashes in IOs. Some of the above-mentioned
solutions are merely recommended best practices, while others are
mandatory law. Regardless, if some of the solutions were adopted
voluntarily, they could still improve the position of minorities.
One strategy that has proven particularly useful to small shareholders is
disclosure of corporate affairs. Indeed, international organizations have
responded to calls for greater transparency in recent years by increasing
circulation of annual reports, memoranda, and other materials. However,
corporate disclosure goes farther than these practices. In corporate law,
disclosure documents are reviewed and amended by third parties, including
lawyers, accountants, and investment bankers. Collectively called
gatekeepers, these professionals stake their reputation on providing the
most accurate account of company affairs as possible, and can face liability
if their due diligence is insufficient. Although far from perfect, this system
at least ensures managers are not in absolute control of the information
203 See Joseph A. McCahery & Erik P.M. Vermeulen, Understanding the Board of Directors After the
Financial Crisis: Some Lessons for Europe, 41 J. L. & SOC’Y 121, 127–29 (2014).
204 See Steven Davidoff Solomon, Shareholders Vote with Their Dollars to Have Less of a Say, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 4, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/05/business/dealbook/shareholdersvote-with-their-dollars-to-have-less-of-a-say.html?_r=0.
205 See Goshen & Squire, supra note 167.
206 See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Mandatory/Enabling Balance in Corporate Law: An Essay on the Judicial
Role, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1618, 1620 (1989).
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released. Moreover, corporate disclosure is addressed to shareholders (i.e.,
owners of the corporation), whose support is vital for management. For
these reasons, corporate disclosures are not mere marketing materials.
Rather, they describe both the achievements and hardships facing the
corporation at a given moment. Lastly, corporate disclosures are updated at
regular intervals, thus keeping the flow of information ongoing.
Corporate law regards mandatory disclosure as a regulatory technique
that serves primarily small shareholders, protecting them against both
overreaching majorities and self-serving agents.207 Disclosure requirements
can both force managers to submit their actions to scrutiny, and serve as a
check on powerful shareholders who want to exert influence behind the
scenes.208 Moreover, disclosure of problems makes correction of course
easier and more immediate. While these functions are useful to all
shareholders, they are particularly valuable to small ones, who otherwise lack
the resources and expertise to delve into corporate affairs.209 Through
disclosure requirements, minority shareholders offload part of the costs of
supervising the corporation on to those who possess the information
already, i.e., managers and majority shareholders. In other words, a small
shareholder lacks the capacity to supervise every corporation she could own
stocks in. As such, mandatory disclosure enables small shareholders to
carefully assess company data, rather than collect it.
Disclosure, of course, is not without costs. The management team must
spend considerable time and effort gathering information and drafting the
disclosure. Moreover, corporate disclosures may help competitors by
revealing the company’s strategies or plans. To avoid overburdening the
corporation, federal law only requires disclosure of events material to the
company’s financial position.210 Traditionally, events were material if their
impact on the corporation’s annual revenues exceeded a 5% threshold.211 In
recent years, courts and the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) has
moved to a more nuanced approach that combines quantitative and
qualitative considerations.212 Under this approach, corporations need not
reveal every detail of their business. Rather, they must only provide
sufficient information for an outsider to understand the company’s major
goals, strategies, strengths, and weaknesses.
207 See generally Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and The Protection of
Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669 (1984) (arguing that the public interest justification for securities laws
survives the public choice critique).
208 See Paul G. Mahoney, Mandatory Disclosure as a Solution to Agency Problems, 62 U. CHI. L. REV.
1047 (1995).
209 John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure System, 70 VA.
L. REV. 717, 738 (1984).
210 TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).
211 SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99, 64 Fed. Reg. 45150 (Aug. 19, 1999).
212 Ganino v. Citizens Utilities Co., 228 F.3d 154 (2d Cir. 2000).
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Just like small shareholders, less powerful states face dynamics that limit
their ability to effectively look after their interests in many IOs. Often,
smaller states seek to join forces and achieve some level of representation
for their region, if not for each state individually. For example, the Group
of 77 (G-77) has been lobbying for Brazil to get a seat on the Security
Council.213 This effort rests on two assumptions: that Brazil will devote the
resources necessary to do all the information gathering and analysis, and
that, once it does, its interests will be in line with the remaining G-77. Either
of these assumptions, or both, may prove wrong as different issues reach
the IO. Instead, we argue, smaller countries would be better served by
getting more disclosure from IO secretariats and courts. With more
disclosure, smaller states could examine the contours of the IOs’ decisions
themselves, and form their own alliances on each matter. Moreover, it could
empower a broad range of actors, such as multiple states and civil society
organizations, to monitor the IOs and call for intervention when necessary.
In this way, disclosures will serve as a check on IO decision-making similar
to the requirement to provide a reasoned justification for rulemaking in
domestic administrative procedures.214 A decision’s importance in the
overall IO scheme could determine whether it needs to be disclosed or not,
so that IO staff are not flooded with requests, and so that important issues
are flagged for small country missions.
While disclosure could help small shareholders monitor corporate
affairs and deter wrongdoing during the firm’s ordinary course of business,
there are circumstances where small shareholders may need even greater
assistance and protection. Specifically, when a proposed business move
might benefit both the corporation and the controlling shareholder or the
manager, it is hard to distinguish ex ante whether a fiduciary duty issue has
arisen. For example, the corporation may look into buying a piece of
property that belongs to a major shareholder on favorable terms. Depending
on the pricing, the transaction may be entirely fair, but may also prove
burdensome or unfair to shareholders. If corporate law prohibited such a
transaction entirely, it could deprive the corporation from a potentially
lucrative business opportunity. After all, the shareholder’s property could be
particularly appealing.
Instead, corporate law provides a separate governance approach for
assessing deals where the corporate entity and key shareholders are
counterparties, relying on two mechanisms.215 The first mechanism consists
of the appointment of independent board members tasked with negotiating
213 See, e.g., Marcello M. Valenca & Gustavo Carvalho, Soft Power, Hard Aspirations: The Shifting Role
of Power in Brazilian Foreign Policy, 8 BRAZ. POL. SCI. REV. 66 (2014).
214 See Majone, supra note 53, at 118.
215 These mechanisms were recommended by the Delaware Supreme Court in Weinberger v.
UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
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with the majority shareholder at arm’s length.216 This mechanism serves to
prevent key shareholders from placing undue pressure on the board. But
since such pressures cannot be fully prevented ex ante, the second procedural
mechanism offers an additional safeguard. Under Delaware jurisprudence,
the conflicted shareholder must abstain from any vote about her transaction
with the corporation. Thus, the proposed transaction must win the support
of a majority of minority shareholders in order to shed any taint of a conflict
of interest. 217
IOs often face situations where a proposed move is arguably beneficial
to the IO as a whole, but disproportionately beneficial to certain powerful
states actively supporting it. For example, IMF lending is sometimes severely
criticized for serving the interests of key lender states, at the expense of the
IMF’s shared goals.218 While all IMF members have a shared interest in
maintaining global financial stability, in part by lending only to states that
can ultimately repay their loans, individual IMF members might want the
IMF to extend outsize loans to even insolvent states, which protects their
private banks’ investments.219 For example, the IMF’s decision to lend fortyeight billion dollars to Greece at a moment when many, including IMF
staffers, considered it insolvent, has been widely criticized by large emerging
states like Brazil.220 While a large IMF loan to Greece may have prevented a
global financial crisis, it certainly benefited — first and foremost — French
and German commercial banks with extensive exposure to Greek sovereign
debt.221 The decision to have a former French minister — now head of the
IMF — adjudicate the pros and cons of the unusual loan did not appear
neutral to many smaller IMF shareholders.222 Indeed, in the midst of the
Greek crisis, Brazil, Russia, China, India, and South Africa created their own
competing bank to ensure that a handful of developed countries did not

216 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a)(1)–(3) (2011). In interpreting this provision, Delaware courts
have considered whether the board comprises an adequate number of independent members, or
whether a committee of independent board members has been appointed. See, e.g., In re Trados, 73
A.3d 17 (Del. Ch. 2013).
217 In re Trados, 73 A.3d 17 (Del. Ch. 2013).
218 Lesley Wroughton, Howard Schneider & Dina Kyriakidou, How the IMF’s Misadventure in
Greece is Changing the Fund, REUTERS, Aug. 28, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/investigates/specialreport/imf- greece/.
219 See Copelovitch, supra note 27, at 53; J. Lawrence Broz & Michael Brewster Hawes, Congressional
Politics of Financing the International Monetary Fund, 60 INT’L ORG. 367 (2006); J. Lawrence Broz,
Congressional Politics of International Financial Rescues, 49 AM. J. POL. SCI. 479 (2005); Thomas Oatley &
Jason Yackee, American Interests and IMF Lending, 41 INT’L POL. 415, 415–17 (2004).
220 Philip Aldrick, UK Businesses Demand Return of Powers from Brussels, TELEGRAPH (July 31, 2013),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/economics/10212230/UK-businesses-demand-return-ofpowers-from-Brussels.html.
221 Wroughton, Schneider & Kyriakidou, supra note 218.
222 Id.
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control all major lending decisions by putting undue pressure on IMF
staffers.223
Corporate law may lend some guidance on how to make critical
decisions, such as whether and how to lend to Greece, in a less fraught
manner. To start, the above-mentioned doctrines help identify which IO
decisions might call for separate decision-making procedures. Notably, it is
not the size of a particular deal that triggers special rules, but rather the fact
that a major shareholder also stands to benefit in another capacity (e.g., as a
counterparty). To take the IMF example above, if the IMF were thinking of
extending a loan of unprecedented size to Thailand, and Thai debt was
primarily owned by Thai banks, ordinary IMF lending procedures should
apply. In contrast, after identifying benefits to major shareholders, the IO
can put in place a special procedure along the lines suggested above. It could
require independent experts to evaluate and negotiate the proposal, such as
the extension of credit to a country in hardship, in the IMF’s case. Once
finalized, it could require the proposal to win the approval of a majority of
the IO’s board, excluding the powerful states that stand to directly benefit
from it. If a proposal goes through third-party scrutiny and gains the support
of members focused on the IO’s mission, rather than just side gains, it can
enjoy increased acceptance and legitimacy internationally.
Our proposal for increased disclosure and special governance rules can
help alleviate the clash between horizontal and vertical conflicts in IOs.
Disclosure helps redistribute the costs of IO supervision among memberstates, while special governance rules inject a specialized vertical agent with
higher independence safeguards in the most critical moments. We do not
believe these techniques are infallible, but we do think they offer alternative
approaches that are considerably better than current IO governance choices.
Especially if adopted ex ante, our proposal can help ease the dilemmas many
states face when considering joining an IO.

V. WHEN IS THE JOINT PROBLEM MOST ACUTE?
The discussion below seeks to identify when the joint problem is
particularly pertinent. It also explores which states have the most to lose and
gain from the emergence and persistence of the joint problem. We expect
the distributional consequences and intensity of the joint problem to vary
with certain state characteristics and features of the IO itself. We argue that
small states have the most to gain, and large states the most to lose, from
223 See Raj M. Desai & James Raymond Vreeland, Global Governance in a Multipolar World: The Case
for Regional Monetary Funds, 13 INT’L STUD. REV. 109 (2011); Raj M. Desai & James Raymond Vreeland,
What the New Bank of BRICS Is All About, WASH. POST (July 17, 2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2014/07/17/what-the-new-bank-ofbrics-is-all-about/.
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the joint problem. We also discuss how the joint problem is likely more
severe in old, established IOs, and less challenging in young IOs. The size
of the IO is relevant as well, as we observe the joint problem as more acute
in large organizations than small ones. Finally, we predict that the more
divided the member states’ interests are, the more persistent the joint
problem becomes.

A. Small vs. Large States
We assume large states will find the joint problem especially costly and
troubling, while small states will likely benefit from it. In a purely political,
horizontal negotiation, without an IO, small states tend to lose to large
states. Centralized IOs are likely to constrain the power of large states, and
small countries may come to benefit from delegation to institutions that
trend toward advancing the collective preferences of member states. In
other words, small countries expect to lose most horizontal conflicts to large
states, while vertical conflicts may enhance their relative standing vis-à-vis
large states.
This pattern should manifest differently at different points in time.
When setting up an IO—insofar as states anticipate the vertical problem at
this stage—we expect large states to prefer to grant more limited powers to
the IO, and small states to advocate for more extensive powers for the IO.
That said, large states may agree to delegate broader powers to a nascent IO
as a way to obtain small-state participation. Just as large shareholders often
accept an independent board to attract small shareholders and assure them
that their money will be safe, large countries may offer an independent
tribunal as a way to entice small-state participation. However, once the
organization is in place, we expect independent IO organs to make decisions
that are more favorable to small states, relative to decisions made by IO
bodies dominated by inter-governmental bargaining.
To illustrate, we can look at the institutional designs of the WTO and
the EU. Before the establishment of the WTO dispute settlement
mechanism, developing countries were wary of unilateral U.S. retaliation in
trade conflicts. For example, in the Uruguay Round negotiations that led to
the creation of a binding dispute settlement mechanism and permanent
WTO Appellate Body, weaker parties saw the empowered judicial arm of
the WTO as a welcome protection against U.S. unilateralism.224 At that time,
and in hindsight, these weak states were likely less concerned about planting
the seeds for a vertical conflict. Presumably, weak states knew the WTO
could rule against them as well. However, delegation to a neutral agent in
Geneva made the trading system better for them relative to the earlier
224 Amrita Narlikar, Fairness in International Trade Negotiations: Developing Countries in the GATT and
WTO, 29 WORLD ECON. 1005, 1019 (2006).
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situation, which was characterized by horizontal conflicts with more
powerful trading partners who almost always prevailed. Now, critics would
note the ability of powerful states to take advantage of WTO dispute
settlement, due to the financial resources and technical expertise that
complex trade dispute litigation entails. However, there are examples of
important victories small states have secured against their powerful trading
partners before the WTO judiciary: Antigua’s (population of 90,000) victory
over the U.S. in a high-stakes gambling case under the GATS agreement in
2005 is perhaps the most prominent (though certainly not the lone)
example.225
Similarly, small EU states often find European institutions to be their
most helpful allies. Relative to large EU member states, small states are less
worried about the European Commission occasionally overstepping its
mandate. Moreover, even if it did, at least the commissioner from Malta or
Luxembourg, for example, has as many votes as the German commissioner
in deciding where to take the European project. The Commission and the
ECB have also been perceived as Greece’s staunchest allies in the Euro
crises, defending the integrity of the Eurozone and standing up against the
most powerful member state, Germany, in order to keep the Eurozone
whole.226 Similarly, empirical studies on European Court of Justice case law
show larger states lost more frequently before the ECJ than small states. In
particular, Germany lost more often than any other state.227

B. Young vs. Old IOs
As the continuing battles among states within the UN Security Council
and the World Health Assembly show, horizontal conflicts never entirely
disappear from IO governance. However, recently established IOs, we
argue, typically experience less severe vertical conflicts. The powers IOs
acquire through delegation typically become entrenched over time. So,
delegation may initially seem efficient, as the costs of horizontal conflict can
be contained with delegation—without experiencing a simple substitution
with vertical costs—but vertical costs gradually start to rise.
When vertical costs start to emerge, why do states not roll back some
of the powers delegated to IOs? Quite simply, initial delegation is difficult
225 Appellate Body Report, United States—Measures Affecting the Cross-Borderf Supply of Gambling and
Betting Services, WTO Doc. WT/DS285/AB/R (adopted Apr. 7, 2005).
226 Kash Kasmal, ECB Reaffirms Commitment to Support Greece, Sucden Financial (Jul. 17, 2015),
https://www.sucdenfinancial.com/en/research-resources/market-insights-analysis/ecb-reaffirmscommitment-to-support-greece-7058; Jan Strupczewski, Greece Could Not Exit Euro Without Leaving
EU, REUTERS, Nov. 3, 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-greece-eu-eurozoneidUSTRE7A25H820111103.
227 Alec Stone Sweet, THE JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION OF EUROPE 129–32 (2004); Alec Stone
Sweet, The European Court of Justice and the Judicialization of EU Governance 21 (Faculty Scholarship Series
Paper No. 70, 2010).
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to reverse. This is a well-documented phenomenon.228 IOs do not rest on
nimble and flexible bargains that can be easily renegotiated when vertical
conflict deepens. Institutional arrangements are often remarkably persistent,
as the theory of path dependence suggests.229 Moreover, the difficulty of
renegotiation is not the only challenge—individual state exits are also rare
in most IOs. This contrasts the corporate context, where one can exit by
simply selling one’s shares. For example, no member state has ever
withdrawn from the EU. Despite all the crises and struggles the EU has
experienced, together with the surge of various anti-EU sentiments and
parties at various points in history, the EU has remained whole and
remarkably resilient. The rare exception is Greenland—which holds
semiautonomous status as part of Denmark—which departed from the
European Economic Community (the EU’s predecessor) in 1985.230 This is
why the U.K.’s decision this year to exit from the EU is all the more striking.
Other IOs exhibit a similar stickiness. NATO membership has
expanded in the decades since its creation with only rare—and even then,
only temporary—exits. France withdrew from NATO’s integrated military
command structures in 1966, only to resume its full membership in 2009.231
Similarly, Greece briefly withdrew from NATO in 1974, but re-joined in
1980.232 No member has left the WTO to date.233 Venezuela has denounced
the American Convention in order to escape the jurisdiction of the InterAmerican Court,234 but perhaps this shows just how far an independent
court can deviate from member-state preferences before an exit occurs.
These examples show how engrained initial arrangements become,
allowing for agendas and institutional cultures to develop and become
entrenched over time. Accordingly, the joint problem is often a dynamic
concept in which the IO initially responds to its creators’ preferences and
228 For example, returning to national currencies from the Euro would be catastrophic for the
global economy. See Vestert Borger, How the Debt Crisis Exposes the Development of Solidarity in the Euro
Area, 9 EUR. CONST. L. REV. 7, 11 (2013); see also David McHugh & John Leicester, End of the Euro?
French Candidate Plots Return of the Franc, CTV NEWS (Feb. 22, 2017, 8:58 AM),
http://www.ctvnews.ca/business/end-of-the-euro-french-candidate-plots-return-of-the-franc1.3296118; Is This Really The End?, ECONOMIST (Nov. 26, 2011),
http://www.economist.com/node/21540255.
229 See Paul Pierson, Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics, 94 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
251 (2000).
230 Greenland, EUR. COMMISSION, https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/countries/greenland_en (last
visited Dec. 3, 2017).
231 Maurice Vaïsse, France and NATO: An History, 2009/5 POLITIQUE ÉTRANGÈRE, 2009, at 139
(Clémence Sebag trans.), https://www.cairn.info/revue-politique-etrangere-2009-5-page-139.htm.
232 David Fouquet, Greece’s Return to NATO Doesn’t End Turkish Feud, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR
(Oct. 23, 1980), http://www.csmonitor.com/1980/1023/102341.html.
233 Conversely, exits are expected to be more likely outside the club goods. See infra discussion on
the different dynamics characterizing club good versus public good institutions.
234 Press Release, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., IACHR Deeply Concerned over Result of
Venezuela’s Denunciation of the American Convention, No. 64/13 (Sept. 10, 2013),
http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/media_center/PReleases/2013/064.asp.
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allows them to pursue collective gains. Over time, however, IOs trend
toward overshadowing or replacing their creators’ agendas with their own.

C. Small vs. Large IOs
We expect the joint problem to be more common in large IOs. IOs
range from universal IOs to small IOs with a closed membership. Universal
IOs are common in areas where an IO is created to provide global public
goods. In these instances, every state’s participation is desirable to avoid free
riding. In contrast, small IOs often reflect states’ desire to produce “club
goods” for a smaller number of states, which agree to undertake certain
obligations in return for certain benefits that can be limited to the members
of the IO. Small IOs often consist of relatively similar states that share
political values, exhibit comparable economic features, or are geographically
close. These features allow them to agree on deeper cooperation.
The UN has always relied on the appeal of universal membership as a
foundation of an international system consisting of equal, sovereign
states.235 Its pursuit of peace and security, as well as higher levels of global
development, are considered global public goods, meant to benefit all states.
The Group of 20 (G-20), by definition, is designed to be a club of the twenty
wealthiest states, who see themselves as having special responsibilities (and
privileges) stemming from their economic and political influence in the
world.236 Similarly, OECD membership is reserved for developed countries
exhibiting certain minimum levels of industrialization and GDP, and thus
sharing a common interest in certain economic policies.237 To take another
example, EU membership is based on geographic location and commitment
to values that all EU members must embrace.
Large IOs are generally more vulnerable to the joint problem because
of greater heterogeneity, which grows with increased membership. We
therefore expect the design features of large, heterogeneous IOs to reflect a
response to a particularly severe horizontal conflict. This might lead such
states to delegate little power to IOs. However, if delegation occurs, our
235 “Membership in the Organization, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, ‘is
open to all peace-loving States that accept the obligations contained in the United Nations Charter and,
in the judgment of the Organization, are able to carry out these obligations’. States are admitted to
membership in the United Nations by decision of the General Assembly upon the recommendation of
the Security Council.” Member States: About UN Membership, UNITED NATIONS,
http://www.un.org/en/sections/member-states/about-un-membership/index.html (last visited Dec.
10, 2017).
236 G20: Members, G20, http://g20.org.tr/about-g20/g20-members/ (last visited Dec. 10, 2017);
About G20, G20, http://g20.org.tr/about-g20/ (last visited Dec. 10, 2017).
237 OECD and Enlargement, OECD,
http://www.oecd.org/about/membersandpartners/enlargement.htm (last visited Apr. 11, 2017);
Members and Partners, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/about/membersandpartners/ (last visited Dec. 3,
2017); The Accession Process, OECD, https://www.oecd.org/legal/accession-process.htm (last visited
Apr. 11, 2017).
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prediction is that the vertical conflict will ultimately become very large. For
example, just as super-majority rules prevent the delegation of sensitive
issues to an IO’s secretariat, they also prevent censuring of a wayward IO if
delegation does in fact happen. This more prevalent horizontal conflict leads
states to feel what we believe is at the heart of the joint problem: deep
mistrust. Deep mistrust leads states to implement voting rules protecting
them from the overreach of their partners, and to make staffing and location
decisions that lay the foundation for joint problems to emerge.
Consider the UN, which today has 193 members.238 Large organizations
require large secretariats: the UN’s global secretariat consists of 44,000
employees.239 A secretariat of this size, combined with its deep collective
international experience and outlook, allows a deeper institutional culture to
develop, and for the power and prestige associated with a high position at
the UN to become more penetrating.
We also assume the joint problem to be worse when an IO is located
far from the capitals of the great powers that created it. While the UN would
seem to be a bad example, since its headquarters is in New York, the
expansion of the UN has in fact entailed a substantial move toward
governance through field offices scattered across the globe.240 Today, 60%
of UN staff works outside its headquarters.241 This transformation of the
UN into a multifaceted agency complicates the monitoring task of principal
states, further entrenching the vertical conflict.
The joint problem being more entrenched in large IOs is compounded
by the tendency of IOs to grow over time. For example, the six-member
European Coal and Steel Community, founded in 1952, has evolved into
the twenty-eight-member EU today.242 The WTO has grown from twentythree General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) members in 1947
to 162 WTO members to date.243 NATO had twelve members in 1949, but
has twenty-eight members today.244 We argue above that the joint problem
is worse in old versus new IOs. As such, growing age and IO size tend to
238 Overview, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/en/sections/aboutun/overview/index.html (last visited Dec. 3, 2017).
239 Where We Are, UNITED NATIONS, https://careers.un.org/lbw/home.aspx?viewtype=VD (last
visited Dec. 3, 2017).
240 See id. (“Our global Secretariat has offices in Geneva and Vienna as well as in Nairobi, with its
economic commissions headquartered in specific capitals around the world addressing the socioeconomic and developmental needs of the countries that belong to the five major regions of the world:
Africa; Europe; Latin America and the Caribbean; Asia and the Pacific; and Western Asia.”).
241 Id.
242 Enlargement, EUR. UNION, http://europa.eu/pol/enlarg/index_en.htm (last visited Dec. 3,
2017).
243
Members
and
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ORG.,
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (last visited Dec. 3, 2017).
244 NATO Member Countries, NATO, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/nato_countries.htm
(last
updated
Nov.
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2017,
11:24
A.M.);
The
Founding
Treaty,
NATO,
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_67656.htm (last updated Jan. 30, 2017, 1:38 P.M.).
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positively correlate: the larger IOs are also typically more mature. In this
setting, we argue, the joint problem is almost guaranteed to emerge.

D. Harmonious vs. Divided State Interests
Directly above, we argued that horizontal conflict is typically greater in
large IOs because the size of the IO typically correlates with greater
heterogeneity. However, a rejoinder to this argument is that size is not
directly relevant. Alternatively, one may argue that a better proxy for likely
emergence of the joint problem is the degree of disagreement among the
most powerful member states. Per this argument, the number of players and
their preferences may hardly matter in some IOs.
Mark Copelovitch documents a related point in his work on the IMF
that we briefly discussed above. He suggests the IMF staff can better
aggrandize its power—by pursuing bigger loans with more conditions—
when the five principal IMF lending countries are divided in their
preferences.245 The EU literature could be read in a similar vein—the biggest
and most controversial ECJ decisions were made in the 1970s and 1980s, a
period during which member states were sharply divided on economic
policy and whether economic protectionism or liberalization should be
pursued.246 In other words, we expect the joint problem to emerge and
prevail in settings where key players fail to agree on the powers of the agent
and the need and ways to rein in those powers.

***
To summarize, we present some scope conditions for our argument. We
argue that the joint problem is most acute for long-established, large IOs
with heterogeneous membership. We also discuss how the joint problem
might trouble large countries more than small ones, because in the absence
of an IO, large states’ interests carry the day. In the next part, we conclude
by outlining ways to mitigate the joint problem.

VI. CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS
This Article has identified a major tension IOs face as they grow and
expand. When IOs are first established, negotiators are primarily concerned
with state-to-state disagreements (horizontal conflicts). States therefore
Copelovitch, supra note 27.
MARK A. POLLACK, THE ENGINES OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: DELEGATION,
AGENCY, AND AGENDA S ETTING IN THE EU 192 (2003); Geoffrey Garrett et al., The European Court
of Justice, National Governments, and Legal Integration in the European Union, 52 INT’L ORG. 149, 149–50
(1998).
245
246
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design IOs with features that protect them from other states overreaching
and shirking. However, as IOs mature, and separate secretariats and courts
acquire power, clashes between states collectively on the one hand, and IOs
on the other, begin to emerge (vertical conflicts). We have argued that
governance arrangements initially put in place to mitigate the pernicious
influence of individual states end up constraining the collective ability of
states to steer IOs in their desired direction later on. Thus, states’ attempts
to mitigate one problem inadvertently cause another.
To illustrate this dynamic, we have focused on specific governance
arrangements that are common to many IOs. For example, many IOs
operate on the basis of consensus. However, the need to achieve consensus
makes it hard to revisit a prior decision, which strengthens the position of
IOs established in their wake. Similarly, all member states seek to place some
of their nationals in key IO positions. But, as people from many countries
staff international courts and bureaucracies, they develop cosmopolitan
perspectives and grow more supportive of exercising power at a supranational level. Moreover, new IOs are often headquartered in locations
removed from powerful national capitals, such as Brussels, Luxembourg,
Geneva, and The Hague. This built-in isolation cultivates an international
mind-set that fosters corresponding loyalties, removing international civil
servants from the key concerns of national governments. To demonstrate
this, we have drawn examples from prominent international bodies,
including the European Union, the United Nations, the International
Monetary Fund, and the World Bank. Finally, states often create IOs with
broad mandates in an effort to include each individual state’s top priorities,
and to make sure these issues are linked, so that as many states as possible
can participate. However, later on, it becomes challenging to constrain IOs
with broad mandates.
The root of the joint problem for IOs is structural, since any IO with
an organized bureaucracy is bound to face both vertical and horizontal
conflicts. We have suggested the joint problem is here to stay, since
retreating from the features that initially created the joint problem is rarely
possible. We do not expect states to radically reform IO’s voting rules,
repatriate the internationally-minded bureaucracy, relocate the headquarters,
or streamline the multi-issue agendas in favor of narrow mandates. Less
radical reforms—through budget reallocations or resolutions that change
the ways IO operate in specific areas—happen a lot more frequently, but
these rarely suffice to solve the problem we have identified. Although this
quandary is inescapable, its full implications have often taken states and
other stakeholders by surprise. In this last section, we begin to outline those
implications, focusing on the options available to states at the point when
the joint problem becomes unmistakable, and solutions to it unattainable.
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To start, our analysis suggests that reforming an IO can be infeasible.
Attempts to change the composition of the UN Security Council is perhaps
the most well-known example of everyone agreeing on the need for a
reform, but where none of the existing veto-holding members are willing to
give away the power given to them following World War II.247 That being
said, reform is often impossible even when the stakes are lower. Any effort
to revisit an IO’s constitutive charters would call for a new negotiation
process, which would need to involve all members and open up painfully
reached compromises. In addition, renegotiations would face resistance
from entrenched interests benefiting from the status quo. This is because
the IO staff has operationalized the IO’s mission in particular ways, creating
expectations for stakeholders on the ground. These established practices
and precedents are hard to overturn. Moreover, the staff may have
developed its own set of values that diverge from the preferences of their
reformers. Against these dynamics, achieving reform may be either
improbable or highly costly.
The stickiness of IOs has led states to explore alternative solutions with
an increased urgency. Exit from the IO might be one such solution for an
aggrieved state. The U.K., for example, has initiated the formal process of
leaving the European Union, after U.K.’s former Prime Minister Cameron
failed to convince U.K. voters that reforming the bureaucracy in Brussels
was possible.248 The many existing beneficiaries of European integration,
including the U.K. business community, oppose the exit, making exit a
costly option for the U.K. domestically.249 European institutions and U.K.’s
key European partners similarly resist the idea,250 making it unlikely they
would replace the U.K.’s EU membership with a set of specially negotiated
agreements that restore the U.K.’s access to the common market. Greece
has also been on the verge of exit from key European institutions. At the
height of the Greek sovereign crisis, the newly elected radical-left
government in Greece was contemplating abandoning the Eurozone
overnight.251 This literally would have required a heist at their central bank’s
vaults, since the Greek government faced the opposition of a forceful ECBapproved central banker, shielded under the safeguards of independence

See, e.g., Thomas G. Weiss, The Illusion of UN Security Council Reform, 26 WASH. Q. 147 (2003).
The Four Key Points from David Cameron’s EU Letter, BBC NEWS (Nov. 10, 2015),
http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-32810887.
249 Isabelle Bell, 91% of UK’s Fastest Growing Businesses Oppose ‘Brexit,’ ICAS (Sept. 29, 2015),
https://www.icas.com/ca-today-news/uk-growth-businesses-oppose-britain-leaving-eu.
250 Ian Traynor, So What Does Europe Really Think About the Brexit Debate?, G UARDIAN (Oct. 17,
2015),
http://www.theguardian.com/global/2015/oct/18/brexit-what-european-leaders-thinkmerkel-hollande.
251 Larry Elliott, Heather Stewart & Helena Smith, Greece Moves Closer to Eurozone Exit After Delaying
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established in the Eurozone treaties.252 For all the talk and almost-cinematic
appeal of reasserting national sovereignty, the exit option cannot fail to mask
its profound consequences. Exiting states risk losing all the benefits of
cooperation, and alienating its hitherto partners.
Given the difficulty of reform and sky-high costs of exit, neither staying
nor leaving the IO seems to offer a tenable solution to unhappy members.
States may therefore begin looking for ways to sidestep the challenges of the
joint problem. This strategy may allow them to continue to reap benefits
from institutionalized cooperation, but also to adjust the terms of doing so
without the constraints of existing, entrenched arrangements. One such
approach calls for creating new IOs to operate alongside, and often in
competition with, pre-existing ones. A new IO can overcome horizontal
conflicts among members, typical of existing IOs, by gathering only likeminded states that are united in their goals and vision for the organization.
Moreover, a new IO requires new staff, and thus does away with the cultural
norms and long-established beliefs often underlying vertical conflicts. For
example, the BRICS governments, disgruntled with the IMF’s failure to
implement governance reforms providing a stronger voice to emerging
economies, launched an alternative global lender, the New Development
Bank, in 2014.253 In other cases, states turn to regional solutions that operate
on the sidelines of formal IOs. The shift to regionalism in international trade
liberalization, with the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and Transatlantic
Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) being negotiated alongside WTO,
betray a frustration with WTO reform.254 Whatever the merits of a
competing IO at the time of its creation, it does not guarantee increased
cooperation and stability. Our theory predicts that new IOs will inevitably
face their own horizontal and vertical challenges, which will only grow with
time.
Rather than generating an ever-higher number of formal IOs, states
often choose to eschew the IO format altogether. Instead, cooperation takes
place through transnational networks, centered on regular meetings among
national officials responsible for a certain issue area. For example, instead
of expanding the WTO’s mandate with respect to international antitrust
regulation, as several states suggested, antitrust regulators across the world
formed an International Competition Network to facilitate cooperation

252 Landon Thomas Jr. & Peter Eavis, As Greece Deadline Looms, European Central Bank Plays Key
Role, N.Y. TIMES (Jun. 21, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/22/business/europeancentral-bank-plays-dual-role-in-greek-crisis.html?_r=0.
253 Agreement on the New Development Bank—Fortaleza, July 15, BRICS, https://www.ndb.int/wpcontent/themes/ndb/pdf/Agreement-on-the-New-Development-Bank.pdf. (note also that the Asian
Infrastructure Investment Bank is also seen to be in competition with the World Bank).
254 See, e.g., Daniel S. Hamilton, America’s Mega-Regional Trade Diplomacy: Comparing TPP and TTIP,
49 INT’L SPECTATOR 81 (2014).
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among them.255 Transnational networks have also become commonplace in
international financial regulation.256 While IOs are distinct legal entities with
delegated powers separate from national policymakers, networks allow state
authorities to participate directly in global dialogue. If they happen to
disagree with the dialogue’s outcome, governments have no legal obligation
to adopt the network’s recommended actions, and may choose to comply
only in part.257 Thus, when differences of opinion among network members
arise, tensions need not be as high. Moreover, networks rely on national
authorities to devote personnel time for their various committees, regulatory
proposals, and implementation reviews. Without an extensive staff of their
own, networks are less likely to develop sclerotic bureaucracies with distinct
identities. By lowering the stakes in horizontal conflicts, and leaving vertical
implementation to their members, networks offer a viable alternative to
states and national authorities. On the other hand, networks lack an
administrative arm with power to enforce their policies on the ground. That
said, these two limitations also characterize much IO activity. While
reputational concerns and peer pressure can encourage compliance,
particularly when accompanied by review programs, differences in speed,
intensity, and interpretation are highly likely. In other words, while the joint
problem may be mitigated, the benefits of cooperation are reduced as well.
The all-too-frequent calls for reforming IOs, exiting from IOs, the
creation of competing IOs, and the proliferation of networks, have
dominated the global scene in recent years. While prior literature has studied
these four phenomena separately, our analytical framework underlines what
they have in common. As the discussion above showed, while all approaches
seek to address an IO’s joint problem, they also entail significant
compromises for the member states involved, as well as a significant loss of
influence for any existing IO. Thus, we also used our analytical framework
to explore governance strategies that IOs can introduce in order to address
the joint problem from the inside and contain member state dissatisfaction.
We drew our inspiration from approaches shaped in corporate law,
which has helped us sketch out the interaction between horizontal and
vertical conflicts. In particular, we focused on two techniques that corporate
law has used extensively: the use of disclosure to empower shareholders
against management, and the role of independent committees to manage
conflicts between minority and controlling shareholders on the one hand,
and top management and controlling shareholders on the other. Neither
255
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approach is unique to corporate law; indeed, transparency and independence
have become buzzwords in international law as well. However, corporate
law has honed specific mechanisms that add to the robustness of both
strategies. Disclosure has allowed shareholders not only to monitor
management more closely, but also to build coalitions with other
shareholders and rally the votes necessary to effect change. Thus, disclosure
may prove a more powerful weapon to a shareholder than, say, a seat on the
board. In the IO context, greater disclosure can help mobilize members that
would not have otherwise invested resources in IO reform, helping states
collectively rein in or redirect a wayward IO. On the other hand, committees
of independent board members are better placed to win the support of
minority shareholders in a reform proposal, compared to management
appointed by the majority shareholder. Independent members have their
own reputations to consider, rely on separate advisors, and tend to do a
thorough review of the question at hand. Thus, they offer higher guarantees
of legitimacy. Especially when the proposal needs to win approval of the
minority, the increased credibility of the committee carries significant
weight.
Our recommended approaches are not failsafe. Sometimes disclosure is
misleading or “too little, too late.” Sometimes independent board members
are handpicked to share management’s viewpoint. Still, both approaches
provide shareholders with additional options, particularly when exiting
through liquidation of stock is not viable. Time and again, courts have
recognized that these mechanisms work to protect less powerful
shareholders, and have agreed to limit their scrutiny accordingly. Before
incurring the costs of abandoning an IO, states might find it worthwhile to
explore whether governance modifications can change long-established
dynamics. Similarly, before establishing an IO, states may find it useful to
adopt an institutional design that can better manage conflict in the long run.
Even when these options are not available, an enhanced understanding
of the joint problem mitigates the extent to which the phenomenon is
unintended, unexpected or misunderstood. Recognizing the existing myopia
behind the joint problem allows states to better understand the fundamental
compromise they are making when delegating powers to an IO. With this
insight, they can face the consequences they deliberately put in place, aware
of the trade-offs and long-run implications of their own making.

